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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation : Post 9/11 Maritime Security Measures:   
Global Maritime Security versus the Facilitation of 
Global Maritime Trade 
 
Degree   : MSc 
 
 
 
The infamy of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and 
the Pentagon caused the US to re-evaluate its ‘homeland’ vulnerabilities against the 
threat of terrorism that intending to carry out mass casualty attacks.  Ever since the 
dawn of the day, numerous initiatives have been implemented to maximise the 
security of the international maritime transport. The initiatives, in particular, 
highlighted the weaknesses in links among the modes of transport supply chain and 
the need to coordinate security related approach among those modes.  
 
The possibility of massive terrorist attack that would be bigger than that of Sept. 11 
had been envisaged on maritime related sectors. Though speculative in nature, hours 
of manpower, millions of dollars and uncountable effort had and have to be spent. 
Security agenda or ‘the appearance of security’ has seemingly replaced the need to 
facilitate maritime efficiency.   
 
Security measures and facilitation aspects of shipping are two concepts apparently 
opposing to each other and the relationship between these two dichotomies have 
been extensively discussed. However, stakeholders worldwide have generally agreed 
that a sound and practical balance between these two security and facilitation 
requirements is indispensable. Security instruments that led to the improvement in 
the security consciousness have been given considerable efficient effect on trade 
facilitation. There is no single ‘silver bullet’ to deal with the issue of maritime 
 v
security effectively and efficiently. This formidable task requires deep coordination 
and intense work of national agencies and international community to ensure that the 
required security on the supply chain to be achieved.  
 
This concluding chapter provides the brief outlook of maritime security measures 
and holds the view that maritime security and trade efficiency are distinct yet 
interrelated. The dichotomies between these two opposing concepts need to be 
addressed on a priority basis. A set of suggestions for improving maritime security 
without affecting efficiency of maritime trade is also highlighted. 
 
KEYWORDS: Maritime security, Facilitation, MTSA, C-TPAT, ISPS Code, 
SUA Convention. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“We are all determined to fight terrorism and to do our utmost to banish 
it from the face of the earth, but the force we use to fight it should always be 
proportional and focused on the actual terrorists. We cannot and must not 
fight them by using their own method – by inflicting indiscriminate violence 
and terror on innocent civilians including children” 
 
- Kofi Annan,  
Secretary General of the UN 
 
 
1.1 Maritime challenges after 9/11 
 
On August 2, 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt. 
The aim of the letter, among others, was to inform the President on his speculation 
that “a single bomb, carried by boat and exploded in port, might very well destroy 
the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory”1. Sixty-seven years 
of age, Einstein’s prophecy is now a security nightmare and most importantly, the 
infamous Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon had caused the US to re-evaluate its ‘homeland’ vulnerabilities against the 
threat of terrorism that intends to carry out mass casualty attacks. The nature of the 
attacks and scale of destruction surpassed any terrorist attacks ever experienced by 
the international community in general and specifically in the US. The attacks have 
been a catalyst on the widespread international recognition by the global community 
                                                 
1 Daly, J. C. K., “al-Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism (Part I)” – In Terrorism Monitor, vol. I, issue 4, 
October 24, 2003, Washington D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, p. 1.  
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that something has to be done to prevent transnational terrorists from infiltrating the 
legitimate global network of international transport in general.  
 
Ever since the dawn of the day, apart from fighting the war in Afghanistan and 
tightening the security of the border and airline industry, the US has also 
implemented numerous other unilateral initiatives, such as the 24-Hour Rule and 
entering into various other bilateral agreements, for instance the CSI and C-TPAT to 
maximise the security of the sector it deemed highly at risk of the threat of terrorism; 
international maritime transport. The initiatives in particular highlighted the 
weaknesses in links among the modes of transport supply chain and the need to 
coordinate security related approach among those modes. These measures are 
designed and built on an existing security framework for other modes of transport, 
predominantly from the airline security framework, established over many years.  
 
In addition, the US has also dragged the international maritime community most 
importantly the IMO to work together in its war against terror. Most important of 
those are the 2002 amendment to SOLAS 74 and the recently concluded amendment 
to SUA 1988. No objection given, the invocation of indispensable security interests 
in the implementation of measures and other regulations that may indirectly shape 
international transactions commercially in order to achieve a single national security 
overriding goal; reduction of the risks of terrorist attacks.   
 
1.2 Vulnerabilities of maritime trade 
 
International maritime services consist of three types of activities; international 
maritime transport (freight and passenger), maritime auxiliary service and port 
service. All these network of activities are vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. There 
are a number of reasons that these activities become so susceptible to the threat of 
terrorism. Firstly, due to its sheer volume of cargo, its overriding focusing on speed 
and efficiency, as well as its international nature where ships sail in a ‘largely lawless 
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frontier’2. All these factors being put together contributed greatly to the vulnerability 
of the maritime trade against the possibility of terrorist targeting the whole maritime 
transport system or using it to pursue their nefarious and wicked intentions. The 
vulnerabilities of maritime industries against numerous security risks is often 
characterised by a much dreaded consequences for example in terms of loss of lives, 
damage to physical property and installation, immense financial lost and huge 
liabilities. 
 
1.3 Maritime security initiatives – a brief outlook 
 
Intending to protect its homeland and interests against terrorism, the US has 
implemented series of unilateral anti-terrorist measures. Even though most of the 
initiatives are unilateral and “hastily introduced”, it was with worldwide application. 
Being the largest trading nations with the share amounting almost 20 percent of the 
total world trade, such initiatives have had immense impact on every aspect of global 
maritime trade. Those measures were seen to be inhibiting the growth of 
international maritime trade where those measures have forced the maritime trade 
related industry to rethink and reappraise its practices and way of doing business.  
 
The possibility of massive terrorist attack that would be bigger than those of Sept. 11 
had been envisaged on maritime related sectors. Though speculative in nature, hours 
of manpower, millions of dollars and uncountable effort needed and had to be spent. 
As a result, industry while trying to refute the need for too much anti-terrorist 
measures, were unable to impose anything substantial towards the government which 
act under the notion of national security. In maritime security, security agenda, or 
‘the appearance of security’ has seemingly replaced the need to facilitate maritime 
efficiency.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Ibid Daly, p. 3. 
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1.4 Costs of security to the maritime industry 
 
For the shipping industry, the need to confront terrorism directly has brought with it 
the clear requirement for a careful analysis of security risk, almost regardless of the 
trading area of any particular vessel. North American waters where very real fears 
about the possibility of attacks on strategic targets such as oil, gas and passenger 
shipping, nuclear power station and the ports themselves has led to high level of 
alertness and the close control and scrutiny of shipping movements. The need for 
security inspections and monitoring have occasioned delays and increased costs. One 
major difficulty in building appropriate security regimes is engaging the active 
involvement of the developing world. Sidelining or employing the developing world 
in the quest of securing global maritime trade would both have its own repercussions. 
Marginally treating the developing world would cause their economies to lag behind 
thus creating new gaps for terrorists to inject the malicious idea. 
 
1.5 The purpose of the dissertation 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify and examine major global and US 
maritime security initiatives introduced after the Sept 11 attack against the US. It will 
focus on the initiatives that have serious implications on the facilitation of 
international maritime trade. To do so, the topic would be incomplete unless the 
conventions related to facilitation of maritime trade are analysed. Further, this 
dissertation would try to identify the tensions and synergy between the need to 
facilitate trade and the need for security of shipping. Finally the dissertation will 
make proposals and recommendations in order to reach an acceptable level of 
uniformity, regarding the initiatives and to balance those security initiatives with 
trade facilitation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE THREAT OF TERRORISM IN THE MARITIME TRADE 
: IS IT REAL? 
 
 
“The events of 11 September 2001, and a plethora of other incidents all 
over the world since, have demonstrated the determination of terrorists, in 
addition to pursuing their political aims, to disrupt our society. One of the 
lessons that these events have brought home to us all is the vulnerability of 
transport networks and the potential they hold to be either the targets or the 
instruments of terror. The shipping industry is, unfortunately, no exception” 
 
- Efthimios Mitropoulos,  
Secretary General of the IMO  
 
 
2.1 The vulnerability of the maritime supply chain 
 
International maritime services consist of three types of activities; international 
maritime transport (freight and passenger), maritime auxiliary service and port 
service3. These three activities led to the necessity to draw out rules and regulations 
to govern them and eventually after the 9/11, the need to secure them became more 
and more imperative and has been embraced into the main agenda of the 
international maritime community. In order to deal with the diverse regulations 
regarding security in shipping, it is pertinent to focus on the very distinct yet 
undoubtedly related factors of the risks affecting the following elements:  
                                                 
3 Fink C., Mattoo A. and Neagu I. C., “Trade in International Maritime Transport: How Much Does 
Policy Matter? – In World Bank Economic Review, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 81 – 108. Available online at: 
<http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/16/1/81?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFOR
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(a) Cargo,  
(b) Vessels themselves, and  
(c) People who work in shipping, including seafarers and companies associated 
with shipping.  
 
Broadly, these risks can be defined as the maritime part on the entire network of the 
supply chain that involves flow of goods and services from the main sources to the 
final consumer. This maritime part of the supply chain comprises of shipping and 
ports activities. A supply chain is the linked set of resources and processes that 
begins with the sourcing of raw material and extends through the delivery of end 
items to the final customer. It is an effective combination and coordination of 
“various channel members” including vendors, manufacturing facilities, logistics 
providers, internal distribution centers, distributors, wholesalers and all other entities 
that lead up to final customer acceptance4. In other words, the supply chain activities 
transform raw materials and components to a finished product that is delivered to the 
end customers5. It is a network6 or integration of transportation nodes that provide 
the physical operation to be carried out with simple streamlined documentation, 
efficient management with effective control towards fully meeting customer’s needs7. 
 
Present information and technology boom have made the supply chain management 
to recognize neither national boundaries nor distances. Taking advantage of the 
efficiency and cost effectiveness of supply chain today, product manufacturers obtain 
cheaper and abundant raw materials from sources outside their national boundaries 
                                                                                                                                          
MAT=&fulltext=trade+in+international+maritime+service&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&volume=
16&issue=1&resourcetype=HWCIT> (Accessed on 20 July 2006) 
4  Xu K., Dong Y., Evers P. T., “Towards Better Coordination of the Supply Chain” – In 
Transportation Research, Part E, vol. 31, no. 1, March 2001, pp 35-54. Elsevier Science Ltd. (2000). 
5 Chopra S., Meindl P., Supply Chain Management: Strategy, Planning and Operation, pp. 3-4. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall (2001). See also  <http://en.wikipedia.org/Wiki/Supply_chain> (Accessed on 30 
June 2006)   
6  Christopher M., Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Strategies for Reducing Cost and 
Improving Service, 2nd ed., Edinburg: Pearson Education Ltd. (2004), p. 15. 
7 Banomyong R., “The Impact of Port and Trade Security Initiatives on Maritime Supply-Chain 
Management” – In Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 32, No. 1, 3 – 13, January – March 2005, 
London 2005. p.3. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. 
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and export their finished products to users in totally different countries. Almost all 
international trade in goods is transported by sea, and ocean shipping inevitably plays 
the central focal role in world trade and thus contributes to world economic growth. 
For this reason, it is not a mere exaggeration to say that almost all goods that we had 
used, are now using, or will be using, are at some time in their manufacturing or 
distribution pass through the maritime leg of the supply chain8.  
 
Briefly, a supply chain in the international trade started initially with the shipper or 
the source, usually a manufacturer. The originator or manufacturer is relying on a 
number of third party logistics providers to deliver its product to the final 
user/consumer9. It then either be transported to the port or consolidated with other 
cargos depending on the nature and volume of the manufacturer’s cargo. This stage 
may see the involvement of a number of logistics players, including buying agents, 
freight forwarders, customs brokers, carriers and warehouse agents. At the port, the 
cargo after that is loaded onto the ship that will deliver it to the destination port. 
Thereafter, the cargo is passing through another set of third party logistics providers, 
before finally reaching the end user10. 
 
But in reality, the supply chains in international maritime trade in particular are far 
more complex and multifaceted. Cargo (physical) and information flow 
simultaneously and endlessly 11 . The so-called ‘complex web of electronic data 
interchange’ now progressively more and more dominates what were once done 
through paper documentation. Adding the headache to this intricacy is the reality that 
supply chains for various goods differ. A simple shipping container on a distinctive 
door-to-door journey will be handled at as many as twelve to fifteen different 
                                                 
8 An Assessment of Maritime Technology and Trade (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, October 1983), pg. 9 retrieved from: 
<http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/disk3/1983/8302/8302/PDF> (Accessed on 30 June 2006) 
9 Simchi-Levi D., Kaminsky P., Simchi-Levi E., Managing the Supply Chain: the Definitive Guide for 
the Business Professional, New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing (2004), p. 21. 
10 Shah S. B., Securing Maritime Trade: Post 9/11 Maritime Security Initiatives and their Implication 
on Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, pg. 3, available online at 
<http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/online.html> (Accessed on 30 January 2006). 
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physical locations which include, for example, warehouses and ports, use a range of 
transportation modes, engage about twenty-five different parties interface and 
produce some thirty to forty papers12 . It is standard for cargo to pass through 
transshipment ports, where it will be unloaded and loaded on another ship. Therefore, 
a single cargo container may pass through more than two different ports and be 
carried by more than a vessel, in addition to the other hinterland locations and 
supplementary land transport modes, which can either, be trucks or trains13.  
 
Despite this intricate contact of people and documents, and the perpendicular volume 
of goods that flow through it, the global supply chain, benefiting from the revolution 
in information technology aided by advances in transportation and logistics, is highly 
efficient and undoubtedly inexpensive. Looking at the supply chain on this basis, the 
maritime support system, i.e. the ports and the ocean going ships, is the most alluring 
target in the whole global supply chain, because that is where it is most vulnerable 
and carries the most strategic significance. Prior to 9/11, with regard to the question 
of security, it was entirely paying attention at addressing the problem of cargo theft 
and protection of proprietary data from antagonism14. Protecting the supply chain 
from being targeted or abused by terrorists is traditionally not a main concern. It 
never took any precedence over traditional security concerns.  
 
“As worldwide commerce grows at an unprecedented rate, so do the risks posed by 
terrorism”15. Terrorists seek out weaknesses and vulnerabilities that can be exploited; 
those targets with the combination of vulnerability to attack, psychological and 
political significance and which, if attacked, poses the least risk to the terrorists. The 
financial cost and economic disruption caused by an attack on the maritime leg of the 
                                                                                                                                          
11 Ibid Banomyong, p. 4. 
12 The Economist, When Trade and Security Clash, April 6th, 2002, pp. 66-67. 
13  Van de Voort M. & Rahman A., “Securing Global Supply Chains” – In Port Technology 
International, 24th ed., winter 2004, London: Henley Media Group Ltd, p. 67.  
14 Spear A.F., “Defensive Logistic” – In Containerization International, Issue 13, Vol. 37, August 
2004, p. 48. London: T & F Informa UK Ltd. (2004). 
15 Latham D. & Toddington M., “Who are the International Association of Airport & Seaport Police” 
– In Port Technology International, 30th ed., summer 2006, London: Henley Media Group, p. 169. 
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supply chain is another reason why terrorists may deem it an attractive target16. This 
is borne out by a study done by the Brookings Institution, an independent US-based 
public policy research institution. The study assessed the costs of an attack on the 
supply chain, in the form of weapons of mass destruction placed in shipping 
containers would be ten times higher than the costs of 9/11. The summary of the 
study is depicted in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Economic Disruption Resulting from Terrorism 
 
Nature of attacks Nature of economic disruption Potential Costs 
(USD) 
Weapons of mass destruction 
shipped via containers, mail 
Extended shutdown in deliveries; 
physical destruction and lost 
production in contaminated area; 
massive loss of life; medical 
treatment for survivors 
Up to $1 trillion 
Efficient release of 
biological agent through 
much of a major urban area 
Disruption to economic activity in 
affected area; threat to confidence 
and economic operations in other 
areas; massive loss of life; medical 
expenses 
$750 billion 
Widespread terror against 
key elements of public 
economy across nation 
(malls, restaurants, movie 
theaters, etc) 
Significant and sustained decline in 
economy activity in public spaces; 
associated drop in consumer 
confidence 
$250 billion 
Large attacks that expose a 
finite and reparable 
vulnerability (like 9/11) 
Substantial but temporary weakening 
of economy due to direct (loss of 
human life and physical capital) and 
indirect effects (decline in confidence 
and network failures) 
$100 billion 
                                                 
16 Flynn, S. E., “Beyond Border Control” – In Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 6, November-December 
2000, p. 62 
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Nature of attacks Nature of economic disruption Potential Costs 
(USD) 
Cyber attack on computer 
systems regulating regional 
electric power; combined 
with physical attacks on 
transmission and distribution 
network 
Regional electricity shortages that 
persists for a week; health risks from 
heat/cold; interruptions of production 
schedules; destruction of physical 
capital 
$25 billion 
Bombing or bomb scares Effective shutting down of several 
major cities for a day 
$10 billion 
 
Source: Brookings Institution 17 
 
 
Another study in the form of port security war game was also conducted a year after 
the attack of 9/11. The study took place on 2-3 October 2002 and carried out by the 
US consulting firm, Booz Allen Hamilton. It aimed to show in detail the repercussion 
of similar attack of 9/11 against the supply chain. The study involved the active 
participation of 85 senior policymakers from the Department of Transportation, US 
Customs18, USCG, Department of Defense, Transportation Security Administration, 
Office of Homeland Security, intelligence agencies, port authorities, and various 
other government entities with business participants, including CEOs and senior 
executive from transportation carriers, technology firms, industry associations, and 
supply chain representatives of automobile and food/beverage manufacturers and 
distributors with critical stakes in port security. The participants were made to 
respond to a mock crisis the way they would have to handle in real life should an 
attack comparable to 9/11 occurred. The scenario began with the accidental 
                                                 
17 The attacks postulated in this table and even their relative rankings, are illustrative and speculative. 
In addition to other economic costs, the estimates above assume an economic value for human life in 
the range proposed in Richard Layard and Stephen Glaister, Cost-Benefit Analysis (Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). Further reading, see 
<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/homeland/chapter1.pdf> (Accessed on 20 August 2006) 
18 On March 1, 2003, US Customs Service along with the Inspections Programme on the Immigration 
and Naturalization (INS) and the Border Patrol of the INS combined to form the Customs and Border 
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discovery of a radiological bomb in a container on a truck as it left the port of Los 
Angeles. It escalated with the detention of suspected terrorists at the port of 
Savannah. Over a simulated period of three weeks, another bomb was detected in 
Minneapolis, shipped through Halifax, Nova Scotia, and a third bomb exploded in 
Chicago. At the end of the war game, it was estimated that the financial losses 
resulting from the attacks came to about USD 58 billion19. 
 
Back in 2003, during the second anniversary of the devastating attack of the US, the 
TV network ABC aired a documentary on how 15lbs of depleted uranium shipped on 
Maersk vessel from Jakarta to the port of Los Angeles, and thereafter to New York 
without being detected. It has caused massive embarrassments because this is the 
second time where the tight American security system was breached20. The first time 
was involving the use of P&O Nedlloyd containership21. 
 
2.1.1 Cargo-related risks 
 
After the World War II particularly, the world economy flourished. The booming of 
the world economy inevitably led to great development in the means of handling 
maritime cargo. Initially, maritime cargo was moved in individual packages, and 
then the system of containerization was introduced and eventually become one of the 
most modern and effective means to handle maritime cargo. Initially started in mid-
1950 by Malcolm McLean, owner of a North Carolina trucking firm, containerization 
has gained its popularity as the most effective method so far of handling the maritime 
cargo22. The simplified containerization system allows goods to be moved by the 
                                                                                                                                          
Protection Agency (CBP). With the passage of the Homeland Security Act 2002, the CBP passed from 
the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department to the Department of Homeland Security.  
19 Details of the study can be viewed at the compilation by Mark Gerencser, Jim Weinberg, Don 
Vincent in their “Port Security War Game: Implications for U.S. Supply Chain”, available online at 
<http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/128648.pdf> (Accessed on 24 March 2006) 
20 DHS officials and industry executives argued that they did not detect the depleted uranium – which 
is harmless and legal to import into the U.S. – exactly because it was not the enriched uranium they 
would have been looking for. 
21 McLaughlin J., “Highlighting the security dilemma” – In BIMCO Review 2004, p. 24. 
22 World Port Development, April 2006, Vol. 6 No. 4, England: MCI Media Ltd, 2006, pg. 3. 
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entire trailer and therefore much more effectively and safely. Consequently, port fees 
were reduced due to lesser times spent in port and eventually shorter turnaround time 
for ships. As of today, the vast majority, almost 90%, of world’s non-bulk cargo is 
transported in container ships. Indeed containerization has revolutionized cargo 
shipment today. In 2005, it is reported that some 18 million total containers were in 
circulation in the world’s ocean making over 200 million trips per year23. As of 
August 1, 2005, total contracts of new containership reached 1,110 vessels, 
producing an overall slot capacity of 4.28M TEU24. This shows to some degree that 
containerization will continue to gain popularity.  
 
However, the efficiency and effectiveness of the containerization system with its 
staggering volume of container ‘boxes’ seemingly poses the massive challenges from 
a maritime security point of view. As mentioned earlier, the maritime trade supply 
chain involved approximately dozens of actors, piles of documents, use two or three 
different modes and be handled at almost fifteen different locations physically. 
Around 5.88 billion tons of goods were carried via the world’s oceans in 2002, 
accounting for over 80% of world trade by volume25. Because of the sheer volume of 
cargo and the need for smooth flow of trade, the focus of the maritime transport 
system has always been on the speed and efficiency of cargo movement, foregoing to 
a certain degree other concerns, such as crew welfare and security matters.  
 
Cargos generally fall into two categories, bulk cargos and container cargos. Bulk 
cargos can be further classified into two categories, tanker cargos and dry bulk. 
Containerized cargos – cargos carried in sealed metal containers – are perceived to 
carry the greatest terrorism-related risks. The total number of inspections on 
containers is very small; in the US for example, before 9/11, only 2% of all incoming 
                                                 
23  Gerald Malia, 50 years of container shipping. Presentation delivered at the Sheldon Kinney 
Memorial Lecture, World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden, dated 31 May 2006. 
24 Roach J., “World Fleet Changes in July 2005” – In Containerization International, Issue 9, Vol. 38, 
September 2005, London: T & F Informa UK Ltd., 2005.  
25 OECD Report, Maritime Transport Committee, Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and 
Economic Impact, July 2003, p. 6, available online at 
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containerized cargos were inspected. This is simply because of the massive number 
of containers passing through the supply chain. In 2004, for instance, it was 
estimated that 11 million shipping containers were in use and 1.94 billion tons of dry 
cargo were transported via container26. The need for smooth flow of such enormous 
amount of cargos left authorities no choice but to rely on the good faith of shippers 
and the accuracy of documentation. These factors render it especially vulnerable to 
being abused by terrorists. 
 
Container cargos are usually susceptible as a terrorist target in such a way that it 
faces the risk of being stolen by terrorist to be used in their actions or sold to sponsor 
their activities. On the other hand, the far greater threat in relation to containers is the 
risk of them being abused to facilitate and aid terrorism acts. Terrorists can place a 
tiny nuclear bomb, for example, either in a container or in the cargo positioned inside 
a container. This “Trojan Horse27” scenario could be done rather easily, whether by 
the terrorists acting as genuine shippers or workers in the manufacturer’s premise or 
consolidation centre, or by inserting it later at any of the legs of the supply chain. As 
soon as the container later reaches the preplanned strategic target, which may be a 
busy port or when the container is on a ship, the bomb inside the container would be 
detonated. And it would be far more catastrophic if this small nuclear bomb were 
detonated when it reaches or passes through a population centre. This might be 
happening because containers usually do not stop and lay up at the ports. The vast 
majority of containerized cargos move inland via a multi-modal network linking 
vessels, port terminals, trucks and trains, which pass through various cities and other 
strategic targets. 
 
At the same juncture, terrorists to smuggle goods such as illegal weapons or to 
smuggle terrorists themselves could also manipulate containers. In October 2001, 
                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/61/18521672.pdf> (Accessed on 2 April 2006) 
26 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2005, Geneva: UNCTAD, p.15. 
27 European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), Container Transport Security across 
Modes, Paris: OECD Publications Service, p.13. 
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this concern proved well founded. Port workers at Gioia Tauro in Italy found a 
suspected al-Qaeda operative in a shipping container destined for Canada on a ship 
from Port Said. The container in which the suspected terrorist was found was 
furnished with supplies for a long journey, a laptop computer and a toilet. The man 
also had two mobile phones, cameras and numerous fake documents including a 
certificate identifying him as an aircraft mechanic, airport maps and airport security 
passes for Canada, Thailand and Egypt28.  
 
Some commentators argue that bulk cargos carry greater risk compared to container 
cargos. Firstly, it is because they form the bulk of maritime trade. Bulk carriers 
formed 74.9% of the world fleet plying international trade. Nuclear or other 
explosive devices can easily be hidden undetected in the cargos, which face less 
scrutiny than containerized cargos. As a target, they are also more attractive. Oil 
tankers are a particularly preferred target, as their cargos could easily be sold. Ships 
carrying hazardous cargos can be hijacked and the cargos stolen29. 
 
2.1.2 Ship-related risks 
 
Ocean going ships are the backbones of international maritime trade where there are 
more than 46,000 vessels servicing the international trade. Ocean-going ships will 
always remain attractive either as targets of terrorism malice or as instruments to 
facilitate acts of terrorism. There are numerous terrorist threats against the ship itself. 
Terrorists can detonate tampered cargos, placed earlier on the ship, or board the ship 
before blowing it up. Ships could be targeted to a direct attack, like what happened 
on October 6, 2002, when terrorists in a small fishing boat packed with explosives 
rammed and badly damaged the 300,000dwt French VLCC, MV Limburg as it 
slowed for pilotage service three miles off the Mina al-Dibbah of the coast of 
                                                 
28 Ibid The Economist, p. 65. 
29 Ibid OECD, p. 10. 
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Yemen30. Although the attack did not cause massive human losses (only one person 
was killed) nor did it cripple the global maritime trade, it did achieve some notable 
successes, among others, it gained global notoriety, and received tremendous media 
and other coverage until today and secondly and most importantly, it hurt the 
domestic economy of Yemen, the country in which the attack took place. A month 
after the attack, insurance underwriters imposed a 300% increase in insurance 
premiums on all vessels coming into Yemeni ports31. This translated to an average 
cost of an additional USD 150,000 for each vessel entering Yemeni ports. These 
resulted in a decrease of 50% of port activities in Yemeni ports, losing the country 
approximately USD 3.8 million per month.  
 
On the other matters, the ship might also create some degree of risks to being used to 
facilitate terrorism32. This at present receiving the furthermost consideration is the 
likelihood of ships being used as weapons to target strategic facilities. This prospect 
is given due consideration because the fear that the said to be terrorists would 
assimilate the attack of 9/11 where the airplanes were hijacked and used to hit 
strategic places; i.e. World Trade Center and Pentagon. This fear has been given 
coverage especially by the Singaporeans, who fear that a ship carrying WMD could 
enter Singapore ports and the weapons detonated. Terrorists do not necessarily have 
to source for the hard-to-obtain WMD to achieve their nefarious objectives. As 
simple as a vessel carrying large amount of ammonium nitrate, an agricultural 
fertilizer used throughout the world, could be hijacked and the cargo rigged to 
explode when the ship enters busy ports33. 
                                                 
30 The Sea, Issue 161, Jan-Feb 2003, p. 8. Following the attack, a number of Gulf States tighten their 
security and institute new protective measures. Singapore’s navy has also stepped up its policy of 
random escorts for ‘high value merchant vessels’ through the Singapore straits. These ships include 
liquefied gas carriers, crude tankers and cruise ships. 
31 The Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd’s Market Association concluded that the area was a 
terrorist target and declared the increase of war risk premium. For further reading, see Raymond C. Z., 
“The Threat of Maritime Terrorism in the Malacca Straits” – In Terrorism Monitor, Vol. IV, Issue 3, 
February 9, 2006, pg. 8. 
32 Murphy M., “Maritime terrorism: the threat in context” – In Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1, 
2006, pg. 2. 
33 Ibid OECD, p. 10. 
 15
 In late 2001, this sort of fear is not at all far-fetched when Singapore cracked down 
on the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network. It was ascertained that JI had made plans for 
suicide attacks on US warships visiting Singapore. It was also discovered that 
Singapore JI members had already taken steps to procure 17 tonnes of ammonium 
nitrate for the manufacture of truck bombs to attack US, Israeli and British interests 
in Singapore. The rail incident on 18 February 2004 in Khorasan, Iran, that involved 
explosion of ammonium nitrate showed how bad the damage can be. The blast was 
so powerful that Iranian seismologists recorded a quake of magnitude 3.6 on the 
Richter scale at the time of the explosion34. An explosion of a shipload of the same 
material, engineered to deliver the maximum damage in a location like the port of 
Singapore, would create devastation equal to that of 9/11. 
 
The 9/11 attacks proved that the unimaginable can happen35. Terrorists may also 
hijack ships for other purposes, for example, to blow it up and sink it at chokepoints 
such as the Straits of Malacca thereby causing a maritime traffic jam and 
unprecedented environmental damage, or to steal cargos, especially dangerous and 
hard-to-obtain cargos. Some kinds of cargo carried by ocean going ships such as 
weapons and dangerous chemicals are at high risk of being hijacked. For example, it 
was reported that due to renewed concern about terrorist attacks, the Panama 
authorities had beefed up security to protect a British ship carrying radioactive cargo 
from Japan to France via Panama Canal36.  
 
                                                 
34 The accident that occurred in the village of Khayyam, Vishapur (Khorosan) Iran created a death toll 
of over 300 people and 460 others injured and four villages destroyed due to the blasts. Further 
reading: <http://en.wikipedia/Nishapur_train_disaster> (Accessed on 28 March 2006) 
35 Van der Jagt N., “European Shipping Council” – In Containerization International, June 2002, 
London: T & F Informa UK Ltd., 2002, pg. 37. 
36 Becker E., “Panama steps up security for ships with atomic wastes” – In New York Times, January 
15, 2000. 
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Ships could also aid terrorist activities by deliberately or inadvertently transporting 
arms or even terrorist operatives37. This is a regular Palestinian practice in the Israel-
Palestinian conflict, as shown by three interceptions by Israeli forces of three arms-
carrying ships in the period beginning May 2001 to May 2003. Another important 
point to note is that terrorists need not even have to hijack commercial ships to carry 
out their activities. According to some Western intelligence agencies pointed out that 
Al-Qaeda is said to own a fleet of 15 commercial ships. These ships could then be 
used to carry out the activities outlined above38. This is made much simpler and 
easier by ship registration provisions in various ship registers, which allow beneficial 
owners to mask or hide their true identities39. An OECD study found that it is very 
easy, and comparatively cheap, to establish a complex web of corporate entities to 
provide very effective cover to the identities of beneficial owners who do not want to 
be known40.  
 
2.1.3 Port-related risks 
 
It is not my intent to instill fear or alarm in anyone today. But the 
sobering reality is, because we live in a country that prides itself on the 
openness of its democracy, we always at risk of a terrorist attack. 
Therefore, it is important that we address the issue of security and crime 
in seaports now41. 
                                                 
37 Timlen T., “The Broadening Scope of Maritime Security” – In BIMCO Review 2005, Denmark: 
Book Production Consultant plc, p. 182.  
38 Abuza Z., “Terrorism in the Southeast Asia: Keeping al-Qaeda at Bay” – in Terrorism Monitor, vol. 
II, no. 9, 6 May 2004, p. 4. Available online at 
<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=236669> (Accessed on 17 August 
2006)  
39 Herbert-Burns R., “Terrorism in the Early 21st Century Maritime Domain” – in The Best of Times, 
the Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, Ho J. and Raymond C. Z., (eds), Singapore: 
World Scientific Printers, 2005, pp. 160-161. 
40 Ibid OECD, p. 4. 
41 Full text of Admiral Loy statement is available online at: 
<http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/01test/Loy5.htm> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)   
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 The statement above by Admiral James M. Loy, the former head of USCG on his 
statement on 24 July 2001 before the Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation of the U.S. Senate indicated that there is security threats existed in 
ports. The statement made just a few months before the 9/11 attacks had raised some 
eyebrows even the 9/11 attacks did not specifically target any maritime interests42.  
 
Inevitably, ports are the centers of the global supply chain with almost 4,000 ports 
servicing the international trade. Ports play a pivotal role in facilitating global 
commerce43. UNCTAD estimated that container throughput in top 20 world’s leading 
port that handle containers reached 166.62 TEUs44 in 200445. Of these cargos, most 
pass through the major ports. As ports become bigger and busier, they become more 
vulnerable. A large port normally employs thousands of employees, and receives 
hundreds of outside visitors both from land and sea. A large port also sees the entry 
and exit of hundreds of land vehicles and a large number of ships and other vessels 
daily. The 9/11 Commission in their report stated that, “While commercial aviation 
remains a possible target, terrorists may turn their attention to other modes. 
Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface 
transportation”46. 
 
Tens or even hundreds of thousands tones of cargo, in various forms, pass through it 
daily. The US for example, its maritime system includes more than 300 ports with 
                                                 
42 Kirchner A., “Maritime Security: Consequences for the Maritime Transport Industry” – In Ocean 
Yearbook 19, Chircop A. and McConnell M. L. (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, spring 
2005, p. 299. 
43 Kumar S.N., The U.S. Container Ports: Arguments for a Public Policy Debate, U.S.A.: Maine 
Maritime Academy, pg. 2. 
44 Twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) is a measure of containerised cargo capacity equal to one 
standard 20ft (length) x 8ft (width) x 8ft 6in (height) container. There are five standard lengths, 20ft, 
40ft, 45ft, 48ft and 53ft. 
45 Ibid UNCTAD, pg. 73.  
46 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, pg. 391, retrieved from the World Wide Web: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf> 
(Accessed on 25 March 2006)   
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more than 3700 terminals spreading along thousands of miles of coastline 47 . 
Unavoidably, it also normally houses key strategic facilities such as LNG depot or 
bunkers and warehouses storing hazardous cargo. The LNG for instance, is 
extremely important for the US where it fulfilled ten percent of US energy needs. 
With docking facilities costing more than USD1 billion, any terrorist attack would 
cripple the US economy in the extreme. As such, LNG imports bound for U.S. 
require USCG escort vessels while 200 nautical miles at sea48. Ports represent a 
bottleneck of each nation’s lifeline49; as such it carries a high risk of becoming a 
target for terrorist, or of being used by terrorists as an entry or exit point for 
smuggling arms, weapons of mass destruction, terrorist operatives and other 
materials.  
 
2.1.4 Workers/seafarers –related risks 
 
Millions of workers are employed by businesses involved in the global maritime 
trade. A single port involved in international trade, for example, normally employs 
thousands of employees and receives a large number of incoming visitors every 
single day, any one of which may be a terrorist intent on causing harm. Of the many 
maritime workers, seafarers have received the most attention after 9/11. Seafarers 
were traditionally treated in a special way. Prior to 9/11, seafarers arriving on board a 
merchant ship can go ashore and mingle with the local population without much 
entry restriction. Visas and other form of immigration documents are not normally 
required. In 2005, the worldwide supply of seafarers was estimated at 466,000 
officers and 721,000 ratings50. The Philippines supplies the most number of seafarers 
(230,000 in 2000), followed by Indonesia (83,500), China (82,000) and Turkey 
(62,500). Of these top four countries, the Philippines, Indonesia and Turkey have all 
                                                 
47 For further information on the U.S. maritime system, see U.S. Department of Transport website at: 
<http://www.marad.dot.gov/> (Accessed on 14 April 2006) 
48 Daly, J. C. K., “al-Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism (Part II)” – In Terrorism Monitor, vol. I, issue 5, 
November 7, 2003, Washington D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, p.7. 
49 Ellen E. (ed.), Ports at Risk. London: International Maritime Bureau, 1993, pg. 4. 
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faced terrorist attacks post 9/11 and are known to have active Al-Qaeda affiliated 
cells. It is not far-fetched therefore to imagine that these terrorists may pose as 
seafarers, or convert genuine seafarers to their cause either to sabotage any part of 
the maritime trade or to use the maritime trade to facilitate their activities.  
 
This threat is exacerbated by the problem of maritime certificate fraud. Demand for 
seafaring job exceeds supply and regulation of recruitment as well as lax manning 
practices have opened the floodgates for corruption and fraud. In a study carried out 
by the SIRC51, it was found that in 10 out of 13 countries visited by the researchers, 
there was evidence of fraudulent practices in the certificates and the certification 
process reported in 200152. This would mean that many seafarers currently working 
as crew on board ships obtained their certificates fraudulently. A few reasons were 
identified as to the motivation for seafarers to obtain fraudulent documents and one 
of them is for the pursuance of committing crimes, which involve maritime 
transport 53 . If they can obtain fraudulent certificate enabling them to become 
seafarers, what can stop terrorists, with far dangerous motives, from doing so 
themselves.  
 
2.2 Terrorism-related risks along the supply chain 
 
Having examined the threat of terrorism that is persistent in the global maritime 
supply chain, it is timely to scrutinize the two aspects of terrorism-related risks as to 
the major elements of the supply chain discussed in this section. The first is the risk 
of the elements becoming targets of terrorism. The second is the risk of the elements 
being abused to facilitate terrorism. In this regard the supply chain, which involve 
different actors from the manufacturers; i.e. source of goods to third party logistics or 
                                                                                                                                          
50  Institute for Employment Research, BIMCO/ISF Manpower 2005 Update. Coventry: Team 
Impression Ltd., 2005.  
51 The study was commissioned by the International Maritime Organization to identify the extent and 
nature of fraudulent practices associated with certificates of competence and endorsements.  
52  See the abridged report on “A study on fraudulent practices associated with certificates of 
competency and endorsements” by the Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC).  
53 See SIRC Report, pg. 12. 
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the so-called agents. In this stage there are few terrorism related risks in the sense 
that the terrorists posing as manufacturers/workers can prepare lethal cargo/insert 
lethal material into cargo esp. containers to be activated later; or insert terrorism-
related materials/personnel into cargo esp. containers to be smuggled into destination 
country and also the terrorists can steal cargos. 
 
While on the way to the port of origin, the terrorists can threaten the supply chain in 
several different manners: for instance, as following:- 
(a) Threats from sea including:- 
(i) Attack on port facilities/ships in port by small vessels  
(ii) Ships rammed into port facilities/other ships 
(b) Threats from land including:- 
(i) Ships/cargo detonated to cause maximum damage to port 
(ii) Attack/sabotage by terrorists posing as workers/ship 
crew/contractors 
(c) Terrorists 
(i) insert terrorism-related materials/personnel into regular cargo 
especially containers to be activated later/smuggled into destination 
country 
(ii) slips into ships at berth 
(iii) tamper with ships at berth 
(iv) steal hazardous cargo stored at port 
 
In the same juncture, terrorism-related risks may also present on the ships or the 
ships itself is the risk in manners described as tampered cargo exploded aboard 
ship/explosive material installed earlier on ship exploded, attack from other vessels, 
terrorists hijack ships or terrorists posing as crew take over ship to destroy ship/steal 
cargo/using ship as weapon, ship knowingly/unknowingly transport terrorism-related 
materials, or in the worst case scenario, terrorists owned ship that carries out 
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legitimate business to finance terrorism or attacks other ships/port facilities etc. or 
used as weapon e.g. to ram another ships, sunk at choke points, as floating bomb. 
 
When reaching the destination port, the risks would similarly or almost as 
catastrophic as what could occur in the port of origin stipulated earlier. After 
reaching the final point of destination in the supply chain, the risks of terrorism are 
still persistent in the sense that explosives placed earlier in cargo placed could be 
activated when it reaches its strategic target/population centre or, in the case where 
terrorists being transported together with the other cargo, terrorist operatives join the 
population and set their plans in motion54. 
 
                                                 
54 Ibid OECD, pp. 12-14. See also Shah, pp. 7-8. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POST 9/11 MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVES 
 
 
“I never dreamed that the United States of America could be attacked. And 
in that we got attacked, I vowed then, like I'm vowing to you today, that I 
understand my most important priority. My most important job is to protect the 
security of the American people. The threat to the United States is forefront in 
my mind. I knew that at times people would say, you know, it may be an 
isolated incident; let's just don't worry about it. Well, for me it's not an isolated 
incident. I understand there is still an enemy which lurks out there”  
 
- George W. Bush,  
President of the United States 
  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Having described in detail the nature of risks related to terrorism, it is pertinent to 
now direct our focus on the initiatives that have been introduced so far in order to 
manage such risks. Traditionally and known to almost everybody in the shipping 
industries, the risks related to terrorist attacks on shipping have always existed and 
will always exist vis-à-vis maritime trade. However, as there has never been any 
significant incident demanding greater attention on security issues, the international 
community has learnt to live with the risks and adopted a series of initiatives to 
minimise those risks. In so far as security is concerned, it has always focused on 
addressing traditional problems such as cargo theft, cargo fraud, piracy and armed 
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robbery and drug smuggling. Losses through theft of cargo alone, for instance, cost 
insurance companies billions of dollars annually55. 
 
The devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US have completely altered this 
complacent mindset and the global community has attempted to seriously address 
terrorism-related risks. Since the day of the attack, the US has been adopting the 
“two-pronged approach” to garner international support in its war on terror. Firstly, 
the US worked closely with relevant international organizations such as the UN 
(specifically the UNSC) and the IMO in order to take action that requires member 
states to impose new measures to deal with the threat of terrorism56. Secondly, the 
US has been particularly active in coming up with initiatives to secure its maritime 
trade, especially in relation to goods entering the country, bilaterally or through the 
establishment of the “coalition of the willing”57. While some of the measures carry 
minimal impacts on the rest of the international community, quite a significant 
number do have considerable impacts on those involved in international maritime 
trade, both technically and financially as the US is the largest trading nation holding 
approximately 30% of world trade58. Although many countries and stakeholders in 
the industry were against a number of these measures, arguing that they were 
unilateral and hastily introduced, the significance of trade with major economies 
such as the US has forced every player in the global maritime trade into a delicate 
balancing act between the need for security and the smooth flow of international 
trade. 
 
                                                 
55 Trelawny C., “Filling the Gaps” – In Containerization International, Issue 5 Vol. 39, May 2006, 
London: 2005.  
56 UN Security Council Resolution 1373 dated 28 September 2001. Available online at UN site at: 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm> (Accessed on 24 April 2006)  
57 Beckman R., “Legal Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative” – in The Best of Times, the 
Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, Ho J. and Raymond C. Z., (eds), Singapore: 
World Scientific Printers, 2005, p. 215. 
58  Shapiro J., “International Cooperation on Homeland Security” – In Protecting the Homeland 
2006/2007, Washington, D. C.: Brooking Institution, 2006, pp. 47-48. 
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At the same time, IMO and other international organizations such as the WCO59 and 
the G860 too have been active and adopted new security standards vis-à-vis ships and 
ports that are involved in the international trade61. Due to resource limitation, this 
chapter of the paper will only look at the major security initiatives implemented in 
particular by the US and the IMO and discuss briefly some issues associated with 
these measures. It is worth noting that this chapter will be addressing the maritime 
security initiatives in the light of the risks enumerated earlier in Chapter 2.  
 
A diagram as below can best depict major US and international maritime security 
initiatives post 9-11: 
 
Diagram 1: Maritime Security Initiative Post 9/11 
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Source: Shah S. B.62 
 
 
                                                 
59 Further reading on World Customs Organization, see: 
<http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/AboutUs/aboutus.html> (Accessed on 13 August 2006) 
60 Group of Eight (G8) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US. 
Together, these countries represent about 65% of the world economy. Further reading: 
<http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=10
78995913300> (Accessed on 13 August 2006)  
61 Thorby C., “Staying Alert” – In Containerization International, November 2002, p. 86. 
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3.2 Maritime security initiatives before 9/11 – a brief outlook 
 
Before looking in details on the various security measures being introduced after the 
9/11 catastrophic attack against the US, it is of great importance that we focus our 
attention on what maritime security initiatives were essentially in place (and in force) 
prior to the attack.  
 
There were, in fact, a series of attempts by the international community to address 
and improve the security related matters in international shipping. Those attempts 
range from different approaches taking into consideration the relevant security risks: 
i.e. ports, vessels, seafarers and cargo. Over the years, a series of regional and 
international instruments were adopted in international attempts to address the 
suppression and prevention the threats of security against shipping as a whole. The 
international community were still striving to find a balance to arrive at practical 
solutions so that the measures introduced would not hamper the flow of legitimate 
trade, which eventually would lead to slowing of international economic growth. 
Most of the instruments introduced were either trying to put the act to terrorism at 
sea63 within the scope of piracy or focusing to deal with the problem on a case-by-
case basis. These were principally inadequate in respect to combat terrorism64. It 
should also be noted that the two phenomena; piracy and maritime terrorism, are not 
interchangeable. Both in general notably have different motives where piracy is 
committed due to financial or private gains and terrorism (maritime or otherwise) 
was politically driven65. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
62 Ibid Shah, p. 15.  
63 Jesus J. L., “Protecting of Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects” – In 
the International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 18, no. 3, September 2003, p. 387. 
64 Pohlit C., New Developments in Maritime Security and their Impact in International Shipping, 
Research Dissertation of L.L.M in Shipping Law, pp. 9-10. 
65  Shie T. R., Port in a Storm? The Nexus between Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation and 
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, 2004, p.14.  
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Among the very first attempt to address the prevention of maritime security related 
threats is the Geneva Convention66 and UNCLOS67. In both Geneva Convention and 
UNCLOS, the notion of maritime terrorism as it is today cannot be fitted within the 
legal meaning of the violence at sea: i.e. what constitutes piracy covered in both 
conventions. The Geneva Convention, for instance, incorporated Articles 14 to 19 
relating to piracy as it is “hostes humani generis” or “jure gentium” and “punishable 
wherever encountered”68, whereas the UNCLOS reproduces the same regime in its 
Articles 100 to 10769. These two conventions establish four criteria for an act to be 
considered as piracy: i.e. a privately motivated (“animo furandi”) illegal act of 
violence and not part of a struggle for political power70, detention or depredation 
committed by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another 
vessel, i.e. two ships requirements71 on the high seas72. These four strict requirements 
had the effect that an offence occurring from within a vessel and an act that is 
politically motivated would be excluded from the conception of violence at sea as 
described in both conventions 73 . In order to address those lacunae, which 
compromised the safety and integrity of merchant shipping74, the government of 
Egypt, Austria and Italy proposed the creation of a new convention. The convention 
                                                 
66 Convention on the High Seas signed in Geneva in 29 April 1958.  
67 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 
December 1982.  
68 Dubner B. H., The Law of International Sea Piracy: Developments in International Law, The 
Hague: Martinius Nijhoff (1980), p. 3. 
69 Ibid Jesus, pp. 372-373. 
70 Rubin A. P., The Law of Piracy, 2nd ed., New York: Transnational Publishers, 1998, p. 91. 
71 Menefee S. M., “Foreign Naval Intervention in Cases of Piracy: Problems and Strategies” – In 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law Vol. 14, No. 3, August 99, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999, pp. 353-370. 
72 See Art. 101 of UNCLOS and Art. 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention which stated “piracy consists 
of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: (i) on the high seas, against another aircraft, or against persons or property on board such 
ship and aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any state; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally 
facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). Further reading; see Rubin, pp. 366-372. 
73 Ibid Jesus, pp. 378-381. 
74 Mensah T. A., “The Place of the ISPS Code in the Legal International Regime: for the Security of 
International Shipping” – In WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 2003, vol. 3, no. 1, Sweden: Wallin & 
Dalholm, p. 18-19. 
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was proposed in IMO, as maritime security is also an integral part of IMO 
responsibilities75. This convention was drafted in response to the hijacking of the 
cruise vessel Achille Lauro76. As a result, the SUA 198877 was adopted in 10 March 
1988 in Rome78. The SUA 198879 seeks to improve the existing restricted rules with 
regards to piracy such as the “private ends” and “two ship requirements80”.  
 
The main purpose of SUA 1988 is to ensure that appropriate action is taken against 
persons committing unlawful acts against ships, which include the seizure of ships by 
force, acts of violence against persons on board ships, and placing the devices on 
board a ship which are likely to destroy and damage it81. Furthermore, Article 10 of 
the said Convention obliges Contracting Governments to either extradite or prosecute 
the alleged offenders. But the truth is not so, there are only a few provisions which 
speaks directly toward the prevention of illegal acts of crimes at sea. If we look at the 
Convention, we will find that the preamble of the Convention speaks directly on the 
prevention aspects. It states that IMO as the UN body would develop measures “to 
                                                 
75  International Maritime Organization: Enhancing Maritime Security, p. 2. See at 
<http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=582> (Accessed on 5 January 2006) 
76 A group of Palestinians seized the Achille Lauro, an Italian registered cruise ship, in Egypt’s 
territorial waters, and asked the release of the Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. The incident 
which happened on October 7, 1985 caused a series of diplomatic uproar when, in reaction to Israeli’s 
refusal on the demand of the terrorists, they executed an elderly Jewish U.S. citizen. Egyptian 
government managed to negotiate the release of the other cruise ship hostages and took the terrorists 
in custody, but did not actually arrest them. Subsequently, the terrorists boarded an Egypt flight to 
Tunisia but the aircraft was not allowed to land at Tunisia and it was forced to land at a North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) airfield in Italy where a standoff between the U.S. and Italian authorities 
over which government had jurisdiction had occurred. The Italian government subsequently denied 
the U.S. extradition request and tried the hijackers in Italy. 
77 The Convention was later being expanded by another Protocol of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located in the Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol). 
78 There was also another incident that did not fit in the meaning of piracy as defined by both 
Conventions. The seizure of Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria by a Portuguese political figure, 
Dr. Enrique Galvão was also another prominent incident. Portugal appealed for foreign naval 
assistance, calling the politically motivated captor of the vessel as ‘pirates’. That was uniformly 
denied by all states (one of them is the United States) that reacted that the act of Dr. Galvão to be 
treated under Portuguese municipal law.   
79 SUA Convention 1988 and SUA Protocol 1988 are two of the 12 Conventions and Protocols 
identified by the Counter Terrorism Committee of the UN established pursuant to Resolution 1373 of 
the Security Council of the UN. Further reading, see: <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp> 
(Accessed on 21 April 2006) 
80 Churchill R. R. and Lowe A. V., The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed., Manchester: University Press, 1999, p. 
210. 
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prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships” and it affirms “the 
desirability of monitoring rules and standards relating to the prevention and control 
of unlawful acts against ships and persons on board ships, with the view of updating 
them as necessary”82. Nonetheless, since the SUA Convention was created in 1988, 
IMO did not actually embark into any major actions to address ship security since 
IMO is more preoccupied with its traditional role of preventing marine pollution and 
safety at sea.  
 
Articles 13 and 14 respectively establish a general duty for states to prevent the use 
of their national territories as bases for possible attacks and the requirements of state 
to share and exchange information on terrorist attacks as well as defining the 
information requirements. These pose several problems in matters of application 
where: - 
(a) The flows of information were restricted among states that may exert 
jurisdiction in accordance to SUA 1988. This is a big impediment because 
shipping is an international activity where any criminal act against shipping 
would have implications to third states; 
(b) The passing of information aforementioned must be based on the national 
law of the state that passes the information, thus adding further to the 
complications. Unless explicitly approved, most states criminalise the 
passing of information to foreign powers83, creating further impediments; 
(c) Consequently, the information passed would not be timely or, in some other 
worse scenario, not forthcoming at all; and 
                                                                                                                                          
81 Article 3(1) of SUA Convention 1988. 
82 Preamble SUA Convention 1988. 
83 Some countries, for instance, Malaysia and United Kingdom have their own Official Secret Acts, 
which govern the passing of information, mainly on national security matters. In the United Kingdom 
for example, the members of security and intelligence services can only do by the crown servants and 
government contractors, or on special circumstances, the passing of intelligence information. Further 
reading, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Official_Secret_Act> (Accessed on 15 May 2006) 
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(d) Also, the phrase “the reason to believe that an offence set forth in Article 3 
will be committed”84 creates further impediments where it is discretionary 
on the passing state to transmit information based on it “reason to believe”. 
 
Even so, like a number of other international conventions, it remains the commitment 
of the signatory states to enforce it and there are a significant numbers of states 
which ratified the convention without seriously accomplish anything to make it work. 
It was only after 9/11 that the international community led by the US had seriously 
embarked into discussion at both national and international basis on how best they 
can reduce the inadequacies in the international legal systems dealing with the 
terrorist threat against shipping.  
 
Shipping and supply chain are becoming more and more complex as both involve a 
wide range of parties for instance port, coastal and flag states together with shippers, 
suppliers, manufacturers and the end customers. As mentioned before, shipping is an 
international business involving different physical locations in multiple states as well 
as different modes of transportations and a considerable number of actors. Thus, the 
need for international cooperation in order to deal with this new multifaceted security 
environment is high in IMO’s agenda.  
 
However, the attempt to develop a comprehensive system would somehow lead to 
diverse regional and international regulation. And normally, should that occur, a 
countless number of initiatives would be enacted with its own specific criteria and 
standards. Inevitably, it would create a situation where the cure for the disease is far 
more than the dose that is actually needed. It inadvertently creates a situation where 
it is difficult to establish a unified system. On that note, the most important new 
initiatives after 9/11 will be analysed as following taking into account various 
security related threat enumerated earlier in Chapter 2. 
 
                                                 
84 Article 14 of SUA Convention 1988. 
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3.3 Maritime security initiatives 
 
3.3.1 Initiatives addressing cargo related risks 
 
To deal with the risks relating to cargo, especially cargo entering the country, the US 
has implemented three major initiatives: the C-TPAT, the CSI and the 24-hour Rule.   
 
The C-TPAT is a voluntary85 Government-business-co-operation where participating 
businesses sign an Agreement committing them to carry out a comprehensive self-
assessment of supply chain security using the C-TPAT security guidelines. The 
former Commissioner of US CBP, Robert Bonner said: 
 
C-TPAT is a key component strategy – a strategy designed to increase 
security and at the same time facilitate legitimate trade by, among other 
things, using advance electronic information to screen all goods coming 
to the US; pushing our zone of security beyond our physical borders; 
deploying sophisticated inspection technology; and working in 
partnership with the trade to substantially increase supply chain security86.   
 
The C-TPAT is designed to strengthen the overall supply chain security in relation to 
imported goods87 . C-TPAT provides verifiable evidence that every organization 
participating in this initiative and their suppliers watch every event in the supply 
chain. The program requires participants to assess their international supply chains, 
develop a security improvement plan if necessary, strengthen security practices, 
                                                 
85 Kulisch E., “DNV Designs EU Strategy” – in American Shipper, Vol. 48, No. 1, January 2006, 
Florida: Jacksonville Publications, p. 27. 
86 Bonner R. C., “Next Steps in Securing the Supply Chain” – In BIMCO Review 2004, Denmark: 
Book Production Consultants plc, pp. 80-88. 
87  Webber J., “Lighting the Way” – In Containerization International Regional Review: North 
America, September 2005, pp. 13-14. 
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communicate policies and security requirements to their international supply chain 
partners, and monitor and improve security of their supply chain on an ongoing 
basis88. By this program, the US authority is putting the onus on US businesses to 
ensure that their overseas partners are genuine businesses with secure procedures and 
practices in place.   
 
The next initiative, which was launched in January 2002, is the CSI. It is a “multi-
faceted approach that would affect the design of containers, the algorithms for 
identifying high risk boxes and the ability to screen containers at US ports and at 
important hubs in Europe and Asia”89. It is consisted of four core elements, namely: 
(a) Identifying ‘potential risk for terrorism’ containers by using automated 
targeting tools to identify such containers, based on advance information 
and strategic alliance; 
(b) Pre-screening containers destined for US, generally at the port of 
origins/departure before loading them to be shipped to the US ports; 
(c) Using advanced technology; include the large-scale X-ray and gamma ray 
machines and radiation detection devices, to undertake pre-screening of the 
said containers so that the process can be carried out rapidly without 
prejudicing the movement of trade in general; and 
(d) Developing and using smart and secure containers for easy detection of the 
containers that have been tampered with during shipment by the CBP 
officers at the US port of arrival90. 
 
Looking at the above core premises, it can be summarized that the basic principle of 
the CSI is to screen cargo containers for security risk at ports of origin or transit 
                                                 
88 Double Z., “Brothers in Arm” – In Containerization International, June 2005, p. 68. 
89 Stasinopoulos D., “Maritime Security: the Need for a Global Agreement” – In Maritime Economics 
and Logistics, 2003, 5, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., pp. 311-320. 
90 Further reading, see 
<http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_in_brief.xml> 
(Accessed on 7 May 2006) 
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rather than when they arrive at US ports91. CSI is done based on bilateral agreements 
and it is achieved by stationing US CBP and ICE officials at the port of origin with 
the agreement of the respective government to identify containers that may pose a 
security risk92. In order to be able to participate in CSI, the member state’s customs 
administration and the seaport must meet the following three requirements: 
(a) the customs administration must be able to inspect cargo originating, 
transiting, exiting, or being transshipped through a country; 
(b) Containers that pose a potential terrorist threat are identified using the latest 
information and technology. NII equipment (including gamma or X-ray 
imaging capabilities) and radiation detection equipment such as those, 
which can screen up to 30 containers per hour must be available and utilized 
for conducting such inspections. This equipment is necessary in order to 
meet the objective of quickly screening containers without disrupting the 
flow of legitimate trade93; and  
(c) The seaport must have regular, direct and substantial container traffic to 
ports in the US. 
 
As part of agreeing to join the CSI, a Member State’s Customs Administration and 
seaport must also:- 
(a) Commit to establishing a risk management system to identify potentially 
high-risk containers, and automating that system. This system should 
include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting 
decisions and identifying best practices; 
(b) commit to sharing critical data, intelligence, and risk management 
information with the US CBP in order to do collaborative targeting, and 
developing an automated mechanism for these exchanges; 
                                                 
91 Roach A. J., “Container and Port Security: a Bilateral Perspective” – In the International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 18, no. 3, September 2003, pp. 343. 
92 Barnes P., “Crisis Management Capabilities in Maritime Trading Systems”, p. 3 – In Proceedings 
the Australian-New Zealand International Business Conference: Dynamism and Challenges in 
Internationalization (2004). Canberra, Australia. 
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(c) conduct a thorough port assessment to ascertain vulnerable links in a port’s 
infrastructure and commit to resolving those vulnerabilities; and 
(d) Commit to conduct integrity programs to prevent lapses in employee 
integrity and to identify and combat breaches in integrity. 
 
The initial objective of the CSI is to engage the 20 major world ports that between 
them account for about 70 percent of the 5.7 million sea containers entering the US 
annually. Most of the ports (as per Appendix A) have either implemented the 
initiative or signed the agreement, together with a number of ports outside the top 20. 
As of November 2005, forty-one CSI port agreements were signed where the host 
countries allow the preloading inspections of suspected cargoes by the U.S. customs 
inspectors stationed in each of those countries94. As CSI is done on bilateral basis, it 
does offer some degree of reciprocity where the CSI partner countries can send its 
customs officials to the US ports to undertake the pre-screening of ‘suspected’ 
containers that will be exported to their respective countries from the US ports95.  
 
Albeit the efficient implementation of CSI, there is another important matter that 
needs to be solved i.e. to determine the level of risk of each container. This requires 
detailed and accurate information which most of the time is unavailable. This leads 
to the introduction of the third initiative called the 24-Hour Rule, which was later 
mandated by the Trade Act 2002. With effect from December 2, 2002, the CBP 
implements this rule and requires ocean carriers to submit cargo manifest earlier and 
in greater detail than before96. Under this new rule, the cargo manifests of U.S.-
bound containers must be submitted twenty-four hours before it is loaded in a foreign 
port to allow CBP to analyze container content information. Ocean carriers must 
                                                                                                                                          
93 Brown, D. R., “Combined Technology for Cargo Security” – In Port Technology International, 21st 
ed., spring 2004, London: Henley Publishing Ltd., p. 163. 
94 Flynn S. E., “Port Security is Still a House of Cards” – In Far Eastern Economic Review, January/ 
February 2006. 
95 Ibid Roach, p. 346. 
96  The type of information needed is a precise description of the cargo, quantity or number of 
packages, container number, and seal numbers (for all seals affixed to containers). The “Non-Vessel 
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submit cargo manifests to CBP twenty-four hours before US-bound containers are 
loaded in a foreign port.  
 
Under the old rules, cargo manifests must be filed with Customs upon arrival in a US 
port, although, in practice, the vast majority of carriers file their cargo manifest 
electronically with Customs forty-eight hours before arrival97. The rule requires not 
only advanced submission, but also lists the specific informational elements that 
would need to be included in the submitted cargo manifest. Vague cargo terms such 
as “FAK”, “general cargo” and “STC” are not acceptable98. Failure to comply with 
the rule will result in the cargo being considered as suspicious and a “DNL” message 
is issued while still in the foreign port99. If cargo were loaded without prior approval 
by CBP, the container would be denied permission to unload at all US ports. In 
addition, each violation would be liable to a fine. The diagram below depicted the 
inspections percentage of shipping containers that arrived in US ports in 2002-2004. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of the Shipping Containers Inspected 
 
Source: d’Arcy (et. al.)100 
                                                                                                                                          
Operating Common Carrier (NVOCC)” must submit this information through the CBP Automated 
Manifest System (AMS) by the carrier or, if the NVOCC has been AMS certified.  
97 See <http://www.apl.com/security/html/cutoffs.html> (Accessed on 13 July 2006) 
98 See <http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/March/Other/rules_cargosecurity.xml>  
(Accessed on 16 May 2006) 
99 Ibid Daly (II), p. 7. 
100 d’Arcy M. (et. al.), Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 2006, p. 196. 
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3.3.2 Initiatives addressing ship-related risks 
 
(a) International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
 
The most important ships and ports security initiatives imposed after 9/11 was the 
ISPS Code introduced by the IMO. From 9 – 13 December 2002, the Diplomatic 
Conference on Maritime Security 101  convened at IMO and passed numerous 
resolution amending SOLAS 74 including adopting the ISPS Code102. Adopted in 
record time103, the ISPS Code rested on the premise that “it was better to detect and 
frustrate terrorists as far away as possible from the shores of America” and to 
“improve the security of foreign ports and ships, especially those ports which traded 
with the US and those ships that visited US ports”104. The Code is part of SOLAS 74, 
thus made compliance is mandatory for all the 156 Contacting Governments105 to 
SOLAS 74.   
 
The ISPS Code applies to all passenger ships, cargo ships above 500 grt and mobile 
offshore drilling units involved in international trade106  with effect from 1 July 
2004107. Though there were some hopes that the deadline would be extended or the 
                                                 
101 108 Contracting Governments to the SOLAS 1974 attended the Diplomatic Conference, observers 
from two IMO member states and observers from the two IMO associated members. There were also 
observers from other United Nations specialised agencies, intergovernmental organizations and non-
governmental organizations. 
102 The existing SOLAS 1974 Chapter XI (Special measures to enhance maritime safety) has been re-
numbered as Chapter XI-1. And a new Chapter XI-2 (Special Measures to enhance maritime security) 
is added after the renumbered Chapter XI-1. Regulation XI-2/2 of the new chapter enshrines the ISPS 
Code. 
103 The ISPS Code came into picture 15 months and 2 days after the 9/11 incidence. There is another 
work done in a faster track; i.e. after Estonia ferry disaster – 14 months and a day. More information 
on IMO works after the ferry disaster, see: <http://www.imo.org/Home.asp?topic_id=821> (Estonia 
ferry disaster – Accessed on 20 August 2006)  
104 Parrit B., “Implement the ISPS Code by 1 July 2004? You must be joking!” – In BIMCO Review 
2004, Denmark: Book Production Consultant plc, pp. 86-88. 
105 The total number of SOLAS 1974 Contracting Governments which represent 98.79% of world 
tonnage as of 31 May 2006. See <http://www.imo.org/home.asp> (Accessed on 3 February 2006) 
106 IMO, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS 1974 Amendments 2002, 
London: IMO, 2003, p. 8. 
107 Resolutions of the Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, adopted in December 2002. 
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authorities in-charge of enforcing the Code turning the blind eye, there were only fall 
into the “category of wishful thinking”108. The implementation of this Code has 
neither extensions nor bypasses109. In essence, the Code takes the approach that 
ensuring the security of ship and port facilities is a risk management activity110, and 
that, to determine what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risk 
must be made in each particular case111. It starts by requiring ship owners to carry 
out security assessment including the risks, threats and existing security measures, 
the appointment and training of security officers, drawing up of ship security plan, 
and implementation of the plan112. Three security levels identified by the Code; i.e. 
Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3113. Level 1 connotes the normal operating level or the 
minimum appropriate security measures are required. Security Level 2 requires 
medium degree of security risk and the Security Level 3 is the highest level of 
concern where a security incident is probable or imminent114. 
 
The national authority will then assess ships that have carried out all the 
requirements or security organization appointed by the national authority, and if they 
were found to have satisfied the ISPS Code requirements, will be awarded the 
ISSC115. Starting July 1, 2004, ships involved in international trades that do not carry 
                                                 
108 Gibbons R., “Turning a Blind Eye?” – In Containerization International, May 2004, pp. 71-72.  
109 Charalambous N., “Issues Related to the Development and Implementation of the ISPS Code” – In 
Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, Mejia Jr, M. Q. (ed.), Sweden: WMU Publication, 2005, p. 
18. 
110 Hesse H. G., “Maritime Security in a Multilateral Context: IMO Activities to enhance Maritime 
Security” – In The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 18, no. 3, September 2003, 
pp. 330-331. 
111 Mitropoulos E., “Maritime Security and the IMO” – In Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, 
Mejia Jr, M. Q. (ed.), Sweden: WMU Publication, 2005, p. 152. 
112  See <http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897> (Accessed on 30 January 
2006) 
113 Ibid IMO, p. 8. 
114 Ibid Shie, p. 19. 
115 International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC), section 9.5.1 of the ISPS Code stipulated that “the 
nature of the changes of the Ship Security Plan or the security management that have been specially 
approved by the Administration, pursuant to section 9.5, shall be documented in a manner that clearly 
indicates such approval. This approval shall be available on board and shall be presented together with 
the International Ship Security Certificate (or the Interim International Ship Security Certificate). If 
these changes are temporary, once the original approved measures or equipment is reinstated, this 
documentation no longer needs to be retained by the ship. 
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the ISSC will be subjected to very strict port state control measures, including 
lengthy delay and even denial of entry. In addition to the adoption of the ISPS Code, 
the December 2002 Diplomatic Conference made other amendments to SOLAS 74 to 
address ship-related terrorism risks. Amongst these are that ships are required to 
permanently mark an IMO ship identification number on the stern or on either side of 
the hull116 and to fit an AIS onboard ship117. 
 
The costs either to complying or non-complying to ISPS Code are likely to be 
substantial. Over 46,000 ships that are involved in international voyage and almost 
4,000 ports serving international trade are required to comply with the ISPS Code118. 
“Good security costs money”119. Based on the report by the OECD, at least USD 1.3 
billion and USD 730 million thereafter are needed by ship operators to comply with 
the Code120. Also worth mentioning that the estimated cost of bringing ports into 
compliance with ISPS requirements is hard due to the variation of needs and costs of 
meeting those needs for instance labor costs and materials is different from port to 
port121. One of the main weaknesses of the ISPS Code is that it only covers ships and 
port facilities; interface between the ships and the port; as such it does not cover the 
                                                 
116 The existing SOLAS 74 Chapter XI (Special measures to enhance maritime safety) has been re-
numbered as Chapter XI-1. Regulation XI-1/3 is modified to require ships’ identification numbers to 
be permanently marked in a visible place either on the ship’s hull or superstructure. Passenger ships 
should carry the marking on a horizontal surface visible from the air. Ships should also be marked 
with their ID number internally. 
117 A modification to SOLAS 1974 Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) contains a new timetable fort the 
fitting of Automatic Identification System (AIS). Ships, other that passenger ships and tankers, of 300 
gross tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 gross tonnage, will be required to fit AIS no later than 
the first safety equipment survey after 1 July 2004 or by 31 December 2004, whichever occur earlier.  
Ships fitted with AIS shall maintain AIS in operation at all times “except where international 
agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information”. 
118 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Efficient Transport and Trade Facilitation 
to improve Participations by Developing Countries in International Trade”, note by the UNCTAD 
Secretariat, TD/B/COM.3/60, October 3, 2003, p. 11, available online at 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//c3d60_en.pdf > (Accessed on 2 April 2006) 
119 Carafano J. J., and Nguyen H., “Homeland Security and Emerging Economies” – In Backgrounder, 
no. 1795, September 14, 2004, Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, p. 2. 
120 Ibid OECD, p. 39.  
121 Ibid OECD, pp. 40-45. 
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other facilities along the supply chain or the suppliers of goods122. Another major 
weaknesses identified in the ISPS Code is that there is nothing in the ISPS Code that 
will stop a ship with an ISSC or any ship to which the ISPS Code does not apply 
from transporting terrorism-related materials. To counter this threat, a few nations 
led by the US have implemented the Proliferation Security Initiative.  
  
(b) Proliferation Security Initiative 
 
While States have cooperated for many years to combat WMD proliferation and 
prevent specific shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials, 
these efforts have largely been ad-hoc. However, the increasingly sophisticated and 
aggressive measures taken by states and non-state actors to traffic in and obtain these 
items require like-minded nations to coordinate efforts to address this urgent 
challenge. Worldwide, almost twenty million packages of radioactive materials are 
transported annually 123. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an initiative led 
by the US, establishing a coalition of countries 124  that will impede and stop 
shipments of WMD, its delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from 
states125 and non-state actors of proliferation concern.  
 
Launched by President Bush on May 31, 2003, in Krakow, Poland, PSI is an effort 
created in response to growing challenge posed by the proliferation of WMD. US 
involvement in the PSI stems from the US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
                                                 
122 Raymond C. Z., “Maritime Terrorism – a Risk Assessment: the Australian Example” – In the Best 
of Times, the Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, Ho J. and Raymond C. Z., (Eds), 
Singapore: World Scientific Printers, 2005, p. 200. 
123 Suarez A. S. V., “Post September 11 Security Challenges to the Legal Regime of the Maritime 
Carriage of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials” – In The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, vol. 18, no. 3, September 2003, p. 423. 
124 There are 16 participating countries that joined the bandwagon to PSI; Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, 
US and Turkey. 
125 North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba and Libya are, in particular, named as countries of ‘proliferation 
concern’. 
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Mass Destruction issued in December 2002126. That strategy recognizes the need for 
more robust tools to defeat the proliferation of WMD around the world, and 
specifically identifies interdiction.  
 
PSI is not a formal treaty-based organization. It is considered as a set of activities 
based on participating countries’ common commitment to the PSI Statement of 
Interdiction Principles, (as in Appendix B) which was agreed on 4 September 2003. 
The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles establishes the basis for cooperation on 
specific activities, when the need arises. It does not create formal “obligations” for 
participating states, but does represent a political commitment to stop proliferation-
related shipments whenever possible and to improve national capabilities and 
authorities to conduct interdictions127. The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles 
identifies specific steps participants can take to effectively interdict WMD-related 
trafficking and prevent proliferation128.  
 
Participation in the PSI is voluntary as it is part of a cooperative international counter 
proliferation effort intended to apply intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, 
military, and other tools at the country’s disposal to thwart transfers of WMD-related 
items to states and non-state actors of proliferation concern129. In fact, PSI is also 
received highest level recognition when in a speech in Madrid, UN Secretary General 
                                                 
126 The proximate origins of the PSI are the subject of some debate where it is said that it stems out of 
the event occurred in December 2002 where the Americans were unable to seize 15 scud missiles with 
conventional warheads clandestinely en-route to Yemen on a North Korean freighter, the So San.  
127 Spring B., “Harnessing the Power of Nations for Arms Control: the Proliferation Security Initiative 
and Coalition of the Willing” – In Backgrounder, no. 1737, March 18, 2004, Washington, DC: the 
Heritage Foundation, pp. 2-3. 
128 Gahlaut S., “Political Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative” – in The Best of Times, 
the Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, Ho J. and Raymond C. Z., (Eds), Singapore: 
World Scientific Printers, 2005, pp. 229-230. 
129 The participant countries of PSI, as a basis for their positive cooperative action, cited the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously by the Security Council, called on all states 
to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in WMD.  
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Kofi Annan, encouraged all states to participate in PSI by applauding the efforts of 
the PSI to “fill a gap in our defenses”130. 
 
The international coalition is focused on pre-emptive interdiction, seeking to allow 
ships, aircraft, and vehicles suspected of carrying WMD-related materials to and 
from countries of “proliferation concern” to be detained and searched as soon as they 
enter member countries’ territory, territorial waters, or airspace 131 .It will also 
encourage member countries to deny overflight rights to suspicious aircraft or ground 
them when they stop to refuel. The PSI, however, would have problems of 
interdicting a ship suspected of carrying WMD on the high seas. It is because, “a 
state cannot act against another state’s vessels132” and without any international 
convention or a UNSC Resolution133 , such interdiction would be a prima facie 
breach of international law134. It is clear in Article 92(2) of UNCLOS 1982 that 
“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases 
provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its 
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.” 
 
In this respect, the US and like-minded countries are, through the IMO Legal 
Committee, proposed a new protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation, 1988. 
 
                                                 
130 Kofi Annan’s keynote address to the closing plenary of the International Summit of Democracy, 
Terrorism and Security delivered on 10 March 2005 in Madrid, Spain. See 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9757.doc.htm> (Accessed on 23 July 2006) 
131 Eraydin H., The Security of Maritime Traffic – Current Application of Maritime Law Enforcement 
against Terror at Sea and its implication on International Law – In unpublished presentation during 
the Fifth Regional Sea power Symposium for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Navies, Italy, 13-
14 October 2004.  
132 Jacobsson M., “Terrorism at Sea” – In Mukherjee P. K. et. al., (eds.) Maritime Violence and other 
Security Issues at Sea, Malmo: WMU Publication, 2002, p. 160. 
133 On 28 April 2004, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 on preventing proliferation of 
WMD, as it constitutes the threat to international peace and security. The Resolution calls upon all 
States to take preventive actions to prevent illicit trafficking of WMD and its related materials, but the 
Resolution did not authorise the interdiction of vessels on the high seas.  
134 Ibid Beckman, p. 220. 
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(c) The new Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Navigation 1988 and its Protocol 1988135 
 
As discussed before, the SUA 1988 created with aims to address lacunae that 
existing in the international system dealing with violence at sea. The new protocol to 
the SUA 1988, or what usually termed as the SUA 2005, adopted on 14 October 
2005 contains several new provisions that seek to expand the scope of SUA 1988. 
The 84th Session of the Legal Committee of IMO saw the SUA Correspondence 
Group headed by the US proposed some new necessary amendments to SUA 1988 
and its Protocol 19888136. The proposed new amendments for both instruments are to 
facilitate, strengthen, and expand international cooperation and coordination as a 
means of combating unlawful acts137. The most controversial provisions in the new 
SUA 2005 are:- 
(i) the addition of Article 3 bis on the offences where a mere transport of 
prohibited weapons may become an offence under the Convention; and 
(ii) Article 8 bis which allows for the boarding of ships flying the flag of a 
State Party beyond territorial seas by another State Party if such ships are 
reasonably suspected to be involved in offences under the Convention, 
provided that the State Party intending to board must first get the consent 
of the flag state. However, the new Protocol also proposes that if the flag 
state does not respond within four hours of the request, the requesting 
party may proceed “under tacit authorization clause” to board and search 
the ship138. 
 
Furthermore, the SUA 2005 makes it an offence if a person unlawfully carries out 
onboard a ship any of the acts listed in Article 3 thereof. It lists down scenarios in 
                                                 
135 This is referring to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platform located in the Continental Shelf 1988. 
136 Legal Committee of IMO document: LEG 84/6/1 dated 22 March 2002. 
137 Mbiah K., “The Revision of the SUA Convention: an Update” – In Contemporary Issues in 
Maritime Security, Mejia Jr, M. Q. (ed.), Sweden: WMU Publication, 2005, p. 172. 
138 Ibid Beckman, p. 223-224. 
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which Contracting Governments will have jurisdiction, and obliges Contracting 
Governments either to prosecute or extradite the offender.  
 
3.3.3 Initiatives addressing port-related risks 
 
As stated above, the ISPS Code also aims to address risks relating to ports and port 
facilities. Contracting governments have the responsibility to identify what are port 
facilities that must comply with the Code. These port facilities then will appoint 
security officers, carry out security assessment, send their officers for securities 
training, draw out security plan, and implement the plan. The designated authority 
appointed by the contracting government will then carry out a security audit and 
ultimately, if all the ISPS Code requirements have been satisfied, issue a Statement 
of Compliance for the port facility. A port facility that does not possess a Statement 
of Compliance after July 1, 2004 will face numerous problems. Ships that visit such 
a port facility will be considered security risks at the ports they subsequently visit, 
and will probably be subjected to delaying port state control measures. Therefore, 
such a port facility will be avoided by ships and will subsequently suffer.  
 
In addition to the ISPS Code, ports involved in maritime trade will be subjected to 
the USCG International Port Security Program. The Program, implemented pursuant 
to s70108 of the US Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, will see the 
USCG, starting May 2004, sending teams to countries around the world to evaluate 
their compliance with the ISPS Code and their port security plans. Vessels that make 
port calls at countries that are not participants could be delayed when attempting to 
enter a US port. It is far more complicated to estimate the cost of bringing ports into 
compliance to ISPS Code as the needs and cost varied from one port to another139. 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 Ibid OECD, p. 40-45. 
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3.3.4 Initiatives addressing seafarers related risks 
 
In relation to risks posed by maritime workers in particular by ship crew, the 
international community, through the IMO, addressed the issue at the 1st Maritime 
Safety Committee International Working Group held in February 2002, where the 
ISPS Code was originally conceived. However, the matter was eventually forwarded 
to the ILO for consideration. Subsequently, in its 91st Annual Conference, the ILO 
adopted a new Convention on Seafarers’ Identity Documents, replacing the ILO’s 
Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention 1958 (No. 108) to establish a more 
rigorous identity regime for seafarers140. The new Convention provides for new 
seafarers’ identity document for the world’s 1.2million seafarers141. A major feature 
of the new ID is a biometrics template based on a fingerprint. It also makes provision 
for the facilitation of shore leave and transit and transfer of seafarers, including the 
exemption from holding a visa for seafarers taking shore leave. To avoid the risk of 
an ID being issued to the wrong person, ratifying member States also have to 
maintain proper databases available for international consultation by authorized 
officials and to have and observe adequate procedures for the issuance of IDs. 
 
However, it is the US initiatives that have created the most significant impact on the 
industry. The US has implemented a range of initiatives designed to address risks 
coming from workers employed by its maritime transport industry and by seafarers 
employed onboard ships entering the US. Prior to 9/11, the USCG required ships 
coming to the US. to submit basic information regarding the ship twenty-four hours 
before arrival. After 9/11, the period was extended to 96 hours before arrival, and 
more detailed information is required. Concerning persons onboard the vessels, 
information required includes the individual’s full name, date of birth, nationality, 
passport number, position or duties on ship, and the port or place where the 
individual embarked142.  
                                                 
140 See Mitropoulos, p. 154. 
141 Ibid d’Arcy, p. 139. 
142 Ibid Roach, p. 359. 
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 This information will be subjected to check including by the intelligence community. 
Also before 9/11, crewmembers of foreign vessels calling at US ports did not have to 
undergo the normal procedure for the issuance of visas. The US immigration 
authorities issued a blanket visa to the crew of a ship prior to the ship’s arrival, based 
on the official crew list provided by the owner. However the crew list visa is now 
abolished. Now, despite the agreement at ILO on biometric identity cards of 
seafarers, any foreign crewmember that wants to go for shore leave in the US will 
have to possess a valid personal passport and a valid US visa143. Douglas Stevenson 
of the New York based Center for Seafarers’’ Rights condemned the US decision to 
deny shore leave due to security concern as shore leave is an “elemental necessity” 
for the seafarers who have been months on board144. Even with valid passports and 
visas, there is no guarantee that seafarers will be allowed to leave the ship. CBP 
officials will subject citizens of certain countries to additional security checks.  
 
In addition, the discretion given to officers at US diplomatic posts overseas to grant 
so-called “personal appearance waivers” has been eliminated. This means that 
seafarers must appear personally at US consulates to apply for their visas. A ship 
with crewmembers not possessing a US visa is considered a security risk. The ship 
will also be considered a security risk if the USCG, the INS and other relevant 
agencies, after receiving the 96-hour arrival notice and carrying out further 
examination, deemed it to be such. In these cases, crewmembers will usually be 
subjected to a “detain on board” order. Even if a particular crewmember possesses a 
valid passport and visa, the “detain on board” status can still be conferred. When a 
“detain on board” order is made, the detained crewmember cannot leave the ship and 
the ship is required to hire a minimum of two private security guards for the duration 
                                                 
143 The Sea, Issue 169, May/June 2004, p. 1. 
144 The Sea, Issue 161, Jan/Feb 2003, p. 3.  
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of the vessel’s stay. This is to prevent the crewmember under the “detain on board” 
status from illegally leaving the ship145.  
 
Another initiative that addresses risk coming from seafarers on board ships entering 
the US is the NSEERS. It was implemented in all US ports of entry on 11 September 
2002146, exactly a year after the attack of 9/11. Temporary foreign visitors (non-
immigrant aliens including ship crew) to the US to whom the NSEERS applies; i.e. 
arriving from certain countries147, or who met a combination of intelligence-based 
criteria, and are identified as presenting an elevated national security concerns will 
have to undergo a national registration process that includes undergoing interview 
and being photographed and fingerprinted148. According to the DHS, the NSEERS 149 
promotes several important national security objectives: among them are:- 
(a) allow the US to run the fingerprints of aliens who may present elevated 
national security concerns against a database of wanted criminals and 
known terrorists; 
(b) enables DHS to determine instantly when such an alien has overstayed his 
visa; which was the case with three of the 9/11 hijackers150; and 
(c) enables DHS to verify that an alien in the US on the temporary visa is doing 
what he said he would be doing, living where he said he would be living151. 
 
                                                 
145 It is reported in The Sea, Issue 161, Jan/Feb 2003 that in Louisiana port, one ship is placed under 
armed guard and when 3 of the crew stepped of the gangway to feel the dry land, they were fined 
USD3500 each. 
146 The Domestic Call-in Registration later followed NSEERS on 5 November 2002. 
147  The domestic registration program included citizens or nationals from Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, 
North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen. 
148 For further reading on NSEERS, refer to <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3020> 
(Accessed on 16 June 2006) 
149 NSEERS was the first step taken by the Department of Justice and then Department of Homeland 
Security in order to comply with the development of the U.S. Congress, which mandated an all-
inclusive entry-exit program. 
150 See 9/11 Commission Report, pg. 273. 
151 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) criticises this NSEERS, which is considered as 
controversial, and unfairly target immigrants for detention and deportation because of their religion, 
ethnicity and country of origin.  
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It is worthy to note that the list of countries are among them are Bangladesh and 
Indonesia. Thus, some shipping companies are denying jobs to Muslim seafarers 
because they are so-called, potential security risks. Any seafarers with the middle 
name “bin” is potential terrorist, even the word is actually hailed of Arabic origin, 
which essentially means ‘son of’ 152 . On 2 December 2003, some controversial 
registration and tracking system; i.e. the 30/40-Day Follow-up and Annual Re-
registration were suspended from the NSEERS, but other requirements continue to 
remain in effect153. 
 
3.4 Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 
 
One of the most important initiatives taken by the U.S. that has the significant impact 
in the world shipping is the MTSA 2002. Signed on November 25, 2002, MTSA 
2002 is designed to protect the US waterways and ports from any aggressive act of 
terrorism. In other words, the Act is the US version of the ISPS Code154. Key 
features of MTSA 2002 are: - 
(a) requirements for port, facility, and vessel vulnerability assessments; 
(b) preparation by the Secretary of Transportation of a National Maritime 
Transportation Security Plan and Area Plans for each Coast Guard Captain 
of Port Zone; 
(c) development of security plans for certain facilities and commercial vessels; 
(d) the issuance and use of Transportation Security Cards for personnel whose 
responsibilities require them to access secure places aboard ships; 
(e) establishment of a permanent programme of grants to facilitate the 
enhancement of maritime security; 
                                                 
152 Osler D., “Malaysian seafarers face ‘employment prejudice’” – in Lloyd’s List, 23 September 2005, 
p. 8.  
153 See <http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/16965prs20031201.html> (Accessed on 25 June 2006) 
154 Kulisch E., “Tethering Cargo Security Standards” – In American Shipper, Vol. 48, No. 1, January 
2006, Florida: Jacksonville Publications p. 32. See also <http://www.uscg.mil.hq/g-
cp/comrel/factfile/Factcards/MTSA2002.htm> (Accessed on 5 June 2006) 
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(f) assessment by the Secretary of Transportation of the effectiveness of the 
antiterrorism measures at foreign ports; 
(g) establishment of an enhanced system of foreign seafarer identification; 
(h) creation of a Maritime Security Advisor Committee at national and area 
levels; 
(i) installation and operation of AIS aboard certain commercial vessels; 
(j) establishment of a program to better secure international intermodal 
transportation systems, to include cargo screening, tracking, physical 
security, compliance monitoring, and related issues; 
(k) provision of civil penalties for violation of statutes and regulations; 
(l) extension of seaward jurisdiction of the Espionage Act of 1917 to 12 
nautical miles offshore of the territorial sea baseline; 
(m) codification of the USCG Sea Marshall program and consideration of 
utilising merchant mariners and other personnel to assist the Coast Guard; 
(n) requirements that shipment data be provided electronically to U.S. Customs 
prior to arrival or departure of cargo; 
(o) reporting by the Secretary of Transportation to Congress on foreign/flag 
vessels calling to US ports; and 
(p) developing of standards and curricula for maritime security professional 
training155.  
 
It is estimated by the US Coast Guard that the cost involving the compliance and 
implementation of MTSA 2002 and its related provisions to be approximately 
USD1.125billion initially and USD699million every year thereafter or 
USD5.45billion for the next 10 years156.  
 
 
                                                 
155 Kumar S. N., Vellenga D., “Port Security Costs in the U.S.: a Public Policy Dilemma” – In 
International Maritime Economists Annual Conference 2004, IAME Izmir 2004, Conference 
Proceedings (pp. 35-44), Izmir: Dokuz Eylul Publications.  
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3.5 Initiatives – a summing up 
 
In summing up a workable policy environment post 9/11, it is proven that it is harder 
than said due to little information or data that would be an impetus to have practical 
policy decision. Attacks on World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were not remote 
attacks where organized terrorist groups with immense financial resources, intensive 
training and the most important commitment have carried out those attacks. Attacks 
against the maritime interests similar to 9/11 have been formulated on the “testable 
hypotheses” due to sheer volume and international nature of shipping industry itself 
as well as the possible consequences of such attacks157.  
                                                                                                                                          
156  “New Port Security Regulations will require Billions in Investment” – In Port Technology 
International, 21st ed., spring 2004, London: Henley Publishing Ltd., p. 152. 
157 Kerr W. A., “Homeland Security and the Rules of International Trade” – In the Estey Journal of 
International Law and Trade Policy, vol. 5, no. 1 2004, pp. 1-4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FACILITATION OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC  
 
 
“Recognizing that the Convention on the Facilitation on Maritime Traffic, 
1965, as amended, provides that foreign crew members shall be allowed 
ashore by the public authorities while the ship on which they arrive is in 
port, provided that the formalities on arrival of the ship have been fulfilled 
and the public authorities have no reason to refuse permission to come 
ashore for reasons of public health, public safety or public order, 
Contracting Governments, when approving ship and port facility security 
plans, shall pay due cognizance to the fact that ship’s personnel live and 
work on the vessel and need shore leave and access to shore-based seafarer 
welfare facilities, including medical care.” 
 
- Preamble 11 of the ISPS Code 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A ships master once recounted his encounters with time-consuming bureaucratic 
procedures in the following words158:  
 
Entering the port of XXX from an international voyage, the shipmaster heaves 
a sigh relief on having safely accomplished the voyage and philosophically 
awaits the arrival of the harbor authorities. However, besides the traditional 
glass of cheer normally provided, the port health, immigration and customs 
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officers, the harbor master, harbor police, terminal representative and clerk, 
duly board the ship and demand of our poor shipmaster no fewer than 109 
pieces of paper, including nearly 50 separate documents, before they depart. 
Bills, lists manifests, summaries declarations and statements; and no passenger 
can disembark nor can a cargo be loaded or discharged until the correct forms 
have been produced to the right person. Up to 12 copies of a single document 
are demanded and it is no use for our shipmaster to inform the police that the 
immigration and customs officers have taken all his crew lists – they have to be 
given their own copies. 
 
However, our shipmaster is an expert paper shuffler and all goes well at the 
port of ‘XXX’. The ship clears following the production of even more paper 
and turns south for port ‘YYY’ where, he reflects with relief, a mere 100 pieces 
of paper with a trivial 33 documents will be required. Regrettably the 
authorities at port ‘YYY’ refuse to accept any of the forms prepared for port 
‘XXX’ since their format differs and the form filling is required all over again.  
 
All this is very humorous until the utter waste of labor is taken into account. 
‘XXX’ and ‘YYY’ are merely given as examples, perhaps worse than most, but 
are indicative of the hundreds of man-hours wasted by increasingly expansive 
staff in satisfying the burgeoning appetite of bureaucrats throughout the world. 
                                                                                                                                          
158 This humorous classic account of a problem shown the dilemma is experienced by the seafarers in 
ports that fail to adhere to the facilitation procedures. 
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Frequently through the unfamiliarity with the documentation demanded in 
foreign ports, expansive delays occur, tides are lost and stevedores stand idle 
awaiting the march of paper.159 
 
Precedents, conventions and regulations essentially control most human activities, 
shipping included. These are of utmost importance in order to ensure the safe and 
secure environment for any of those activities to flourish – but there were cases 
where these regulations cause more unnecessary and significant burden on the 
activities that it supposed to control. Due to its global nature, international maritime 
transport also becomes the victim of the above problem. Various countries 
exclusively developed excessive control and ‘inefficient’ customs procedures 
practices as well as immigration and other standards totally independent of each 
other. Coupled with that, the prevalent monopoly of service providers in key entry 
points in importing countries adds to the complication of the matters160. This resulted 
in ships calling at different countries during the voyage expecting to be presented 
with a series of forms to fill in, which usually ask for almost the same information 
but to some extent in a different way161. For example, in Chittagong port, the second 
largest port of Bangladesh, shipmaster has to fill in 30 different forms compared with 
seven, say, in Malaysia162.  
 
                                                 
159 Felding S. E., “Introduction of the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Transport, 
1965, as amended” – In Seminar on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, London: IMO, 
1989, pp. 3-4. 
160  Messerlin P. A. and Zarrouk J., “Trade Facilitation: Technical Regulations and Customs 
Procedures” – In the World Economy, vol. 23, issue 2, April 2002, pp. 578-580, available online at 
<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9701-00291> (Accessed on 21 August 
2006)  
161  UNCTAD, “Compendium of Trade Facilitation Recommendations”, Geneva: United Nations 
Publication, 1994, p. 3. 
162 Transparency International, the Berlin-based watchdog group named this port as the most corrupt 
port in the world for the fifth year in a row. Apart from being corrupt and inefficient, it is also 
wrestled with red tape. Further reading; see The Sea, Issue 179, Jan/Feb 2006, p. 3.  
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The sheer number of documents further raised another concern, i.e. the format of 
each document163. From one port to another, the forms varied from one neighboring 
port to the other ports of calls. The varying degree of forms and procedures that 
needs to be adhered to add burden to shipmasters and crew. It should be further noted 
that paperwork and shipping documentation grew in tandem with shipping and trade 
development in the early part of the twentieth century. By 1950s, it was no longer a 
matter of inconvenience but has become a threat. The complication was further 
aggravated when the shipmasters had to deal with local language translation, 
consular visa requirements, authenticity of the information that the documents 
contain, etc. Finally, of course, these painstaking and time consumption procedures 
have led to delays or demurrage costs for ships164.  
 
The US Pacific Coast shipping industry in co-operation with the School of World 
Business, San Francisco State College, California produced a report entitled 
Merchant Shipping on a Sea of Red Tape on 1 April 1959. The report sought to 
compare the documentary requirements and procedures of the two most important 
transport modes; international shipping and international airline industry. It is found 
that international shipping is in dire need to be unchained of its “self-inflicted 
bureaucracy”. Whilst aircraft was only required to have three or four documents to 
land in foreign countries, ships need no fewer than twenty-two, thirty-two or at the 
most, forty-six separate documents to be in ports. Thus, the report concluded that:- 
(a) ships documentation need to be simplified urgently and the demands of 
individual Governments had to be put in clear perspective with the overall 
welfare of merchant shipping; 
                                                 
163 Kouassivi A. M. F. (1997), Facilitation of Maritime Transport Document Procedures: a Case 
Study of Benin – Master of Science Dissertation, World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden, p. 7. 
164 Ibid UNCTAD, pp. 4 – 5. 
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(b) the cost saving due to unification, simplification and standardization165 to 
both industry and Governments were significant to motivate immediate 
actions; 
(c) establishment of ICAO and its experience to regulate airlines business could 
provide a pattern for action; and 
(d) to achieve successful outcome of documentation simplification, 
Governments have to co-operate among themselves166. 
 
A Workshop on Standardization of International Travel and Transport Documents 
held in Beijing in 1993 also found that the enormous amount of paperwork is needed 
to import or export consignments in ports in South Asia167 as shown in the following 
Table 2. 
 
Table 3: Number of paperwork to import and export consignment in South Asia  
 
India  Nepal  Pakistan  
 
 Types of documents  29  83  15 
 No. of copies   118  102  108 
 No. of signatures required 256  113  56 
 Manpower required  7  22  11 
 Estimate costs of procedures 10 percent of consignments value   
  
Source: UNESCAP report 
                                                 
165 Unification – the process of combining several similar documents whenever possible; 
Simplification – the process of elimination (or at least modified) of superfluous data and unnecessary 
documents; and standardization – the development of definite size, format and language for 
documents designed for a specific purpose and use, and their general acceptance by and use 
throughout the industry. 
166 See Focus of IMO December 1996, “Cutting Red Tape: IMO and the Facilitation of Maritime 
Travel and Transport”, available online at 
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataonly.asp/data_id%3D7998/FALFocus1996.pdf> (Accessed 
on 30 July 2006) 
167  This is based on the report “Trade Facilitation and Electronic Commerce as Catalysts for 
Integration” done by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 
Available online at <http://www.unescap.org/chap4_2054.pdf> (Accessed on 7 August 2006) 
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4.2 Facilitation and IMO 
 
The need to facilitate maritime transportation has long been recognized since the 
inception of IMCO168 back in 1959. Maritime nations, deciding that the issue of 
facilitation of international maritime transport could not be allowed to deteriorate 
further, had turned to IMCO for solution to this ever pressing matter169. Thus, an 
international conference on Facilitation of Maritime Travel and Transport was 
convened in 1965 at IMCO and attended by representatives of 68 countries, 38 of 
them being developing countries and 15 intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations. This conference concluded that “formalities, documentation, and 
procedures on arrival and departure of ships should be simplified and public 
authorities should only require ships calling at their ports to produce only eight listed 
documents in Standard 2.1”.  
 
The conference adopted the FAL Convention on 9 April 1965 and it entered into 
force almost two years after its inauguration, i.e. on 5 March 1967. To date, there are 
107 Contracting Governments to the Convention representing 68.67% of world 
tonnage170. The list of Contracting Governments is as attached in Appendix C. The 
Convention has also endorsed the creation of the FAL Committee which since its 
initiation in 1973 met annually (with the exception of 2001), i.e. 33 times, the last 
being from 3-7 July 2006. 
 
                                                 
168 The name of the organization was changed to “International Maritime Organization” (IMO) by 
virtue of the amendments to the Organization’s Convention, which entered into force on 22 May 1982. 
169 The real starting point of the idea of facilitation and solving the problem pertaining to voyage of 
ships, their arrival, stay and departure from ports was in the forum of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) which took place at the Inter-American ports and harbours conference held at San Jose, 
Costa Rica in 1956. The conference issued a declaration aimed at the simplification and 
standardization of port formalities and documentation requirements. 
170 As of 30 June 2006. Further information, 
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14919/status.xls> (Accessed on 7 
August 2006) 
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The Convention and its annexes trimmed down the numbers of documents required 
by the authorities at the port to eight171. IMO, in particular reference to the work of 
the FAL Committee, developed six A4 Standard Forms known as IMO Model 
Forms172 (as in Appendix D). These forms set down, among others, formalities and 
practices, the status/purpose of a form, copies of each document to be presented by 
ship owners at the arrival and departure of a ship173. The forms are:-    
(a) IMO general declaration – provides all important information about the 
ship; 
(b) cargo declaration -  information about the cargo on board; 
(c) crew list declaration – information about the who’s who in the crew 
member;  
(d) passengers list declaration – information about the passengers (if any) on 
board; 
(e) ships’ stores declaration – information about the ship’s stores; and 
(f) crew’s effects declaration – information on the personal effects of the 
crew174. 
 
The other two documents are those, which are required by the Universal Postal 
Convention and International Health Regulations. It should be further noted that the 
first four declaration enumerated above constitute the maximum information 
necessary and the other subsequent two incorporated the agreed essential minimum 
information requirements.  
 
                                                 
171 See FAL.2/Circ. 87 dated 17 December 2004 on the “Revised List of Certificates and Documents 
required to be carried on board”. Available online at: 
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D11516/87.pdf> (Accessed on 9 August 
2006) 
172 The forms are produced in Appendix 1 of the Convention. 
173 Alorsor G. E. (1996), Simplification of Maritime Transport Procedures and Documentation: a 
Case Study for Ghana – Master of Science Dissertation, World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden, 
p. 18. 
174 Ibid Kouassivi, p. 8.  
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It should be noted that facilitation measures pertaining to shipping, in general, are 
applicable to all parts of the world and comprise of two main closely interrelated 
elements. They are:- 
(a) Facilitation in shipping documentation – IMO175  
(b) Facilitation in trade documentation – UNCTAD 
 
4.3 Objectives and the development of the Convention 
 
Overall, the objectives leading to the development of this so-called co-operative 
treaty are “to prevent unnecessary delays in maritime traffic, to aid cooperation 
between Governments, and to secure the highest practicable degree of uniformity in 
formalities and other procedures. In particular, the Convention reduces to just eight 
the number of declarations which can be required by public authorities”176.   
 
Briefly, those objectives can be achieved by undertaking the following:- 
(a) Simplification – to adopt all appropriate measures to facilitate and expedite 
international maritime traffic and to prevent unnecessary delays to ships, 
and persons and property on board; 
(b) Unification – to co-operate in the formulation and application of measures 
on the facilitation of arrival, stay and departure of ships combining similar 
documents; 
(c) Standardization – to develop a general format in securing the  highest 
practicable degree of uniformity in formalities, documentary requirements 
and procedures in all matters in which to facilitate and improve international 
maritime traffic and keep to a minimum any alterations in formalities, 
documentary requirements and procedures necessary to meet special 
requirements of a domestic nature: and 
                                                 
175 The dissertation paper will only address this first element. In order to avoid duplication of work, 
IMO has agreed with UNCTAD to deal with works relating to shipping and trade documentation 
between IMO and UNCTAD respectively. 
176 See <http://www.imo.org/home.asp> (Accessed on 20 April 2006) 
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(d) Harmonization – to co-operate and assist each other through the IMO in 
matters relating to formalities, documentary requirements and procedures, 
as well as their application to international maritime traffic177. 
 
4.4 The FAL Convention revisited 
 
The FAL Convention consists of178:-  
(a) Articles i.e. the main body of the Convention itself; 
There are 15 articles to the Convention, and the most important articles are 
as following:- 
(i) Article I – In this article, the Contracting Governments give 
commitment to adopt all appropriate measures to “facilitate and 
expedite international maritime traffic and to prevent unnecessary 
delays to ships and persons and property on board”; 
(ii) Article II talks about the commitment of the Contracting 
Governments to “co-operate”, “in the formulation and application 
of measures for the facilitation of the arrival, stay and departure of 
ships”. And as many other IMO conventions, this Convention also 
do not apply to warships and pleasure yachts; 
(iii) Article III entails that the Contracting Governments will “co-
operate in securing the highest degree of uniformity in formalities, 
documentary requirements and procedures in all matters” in order 
to ensure the smooth flowing of international maritime traffic. Any 
alterations to such “formalities, documentary requirements and 
procedures” deem required to meet special domestic requirements 
are to be done at the minimum levels so that it would not hamper 
the smooth flow of maritime traffic; 
                                                 
177  Vormawah B., “Introduction to Facilitation” – In Proceedings of the Seminar on Ship/Port 
Interface and Trade Facilitation, 27-31 October 2003, Suva, Fiji Islands. Fiji Islands: Quality Print 
Ltd., p.24. 
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(iv) Article IV allows the Contracting Governments to work among 
them on achieving the objectives of the Convention, i.e. ensure the 
smooth flowing of maritime trade, or to work with the IMO as an 
alternative; 
(v) Article V, paragraph (2) states the provision that by being a State 
Party to this Convention does not mean that any Contracting 
Governments shall not apply any measures it deems necessary to 
“preserve public morality, order and security or to prevent the 
introduction or spread of disease or pests affecting public health, 
animals and plants”; 
(vi) Article VI defines what constitute “Standards” and “Recommended 
Practices”. “Standard are those measures the uniform application 
of which by Contracting Governments in accordance with the 
Convention is necessary and practicable in order to facilitate 
international maritime traffic”; and “Recommended Practices are 
those measures the application of which Contracting Governments 
is desirable in order to facilitate international maritime traffic”; 
(vii) Article VII stipulates the methods of making amendments to the 
annex to the Convention; 
(viii) Article VIII (1) of the FAL Convention provides that when the 
Contracting Government that “find it impracticable to comply with 
any standard by bringing its own formalities, documentary 
requirements or procedures into full accord with it or which deems 
it necessary for special reasons to adopt formalities, documentary 
requirements or procedures differing from the Standard, shall 
inform the Secretary General and notify him of the differences 
between its own practice and such Standard”. The same procedure 
applies to new or amended Standards. The text of selected 
                                                                                                                                          
178 IMO, Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965, 7th ed., London: IMO 
Publication, 1998.  
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notifications received from Contracting Governments in 
compliance with this provision is as attached in Annexure; and 
(ix) Article IX stipulates the method of making revisions and 
amendments to the Convention. 
 
(b) Consolidated text of the annex to the Convention;  
In almost all technical conventions, for example MARPOL 73/78 or SOLAS 
74, the annexes constitute the ‘meat’ of those conventions179 without which 
the conventions would not be comprehensive. In FAL Convention, the 
annexes were the place where the Standards and Recommended Practices on 
formalities, documentary requirements and procedures were thoroughly 
explained. The annexes have six sections as following: - 
(i) Section 1 – Definitions and general provisions; 
(ii) Section 2 – Arrival, Stay and Departure of the Ship; 
(iii) Section 3 – Arrival and Departure of Persons; 
(iv) Section 4 – Arrival, Stay and Departure of Cargo and other Articles; 
(v) Section 5 – Public Health and Quarantine, Including Sanitary 
Measures for Animals and Plants; and 
(vi) Miscellaneous Provisions. 
 
(c) Six Resolutions adopted by the Conference;  
(i) Resolution 1 – Encouragement of acceptances of and accession to 
the Convention 
(ii) Resolution 2 – Acceptance of Standards 
(iii) Resolution 3 – The creation of national and regional committees 
(iv) Resolution 4 – Establishment of an ad hoc working group 
(v) Resolution 5 – Future work on facilitation 
(vi) Resolution 6 – Facilitation of international travel and tourism 
                                                 
179 Mukherjee P.K, Class Lecture of Implementation of Maritime Conventions - delivered at the World 
Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden. 
 60
 (d) Resolution A.628 (15) adopted by the Assembly on the “Application of 
automatic data processing (ADP) as provided for in the Convention on 
Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965, as amended”; and  
 
(e) Appendices 1 – 6 provide additional information on facilitation 
requirements as following: - 
(i) Appendix 1 – IMO FAL Forms 
(ii) Appendix 2 – Simpler shipping marks 
(iii) Appendix 3 – IMDG Code: Documentation of dangerous goods 
shipments 
(iv) Appendix 4 – Format of the letter referred to in Standard 3.3.1 
(v) Appendix 5 – Certificates and documents required to be carried on 
board ships 
(vi) Appendix 6 – Supplement relating to the annex to the Convention: 
Differences between the national practices of Contracting 
Governments and the Standards and Recommended Practices 
contained in the annex as notified to IMO. 
 
4.5 Amendments to FAL Convention  
 
Starting 1973 and eventually since 1 January 1987, a series of amendments in 
addition to various Resolutions were adopted to bring the Convention up-to-date with 
the present international situation especially in relation to the introduction of 
information communication technology. This is the reason why most of the time; the 
Convention was referred to as the Convention on Facilitation International Maritime 
Traffic, 1965, as amended. Among the most important amendments180 are: - 
 
 
                                                 
180 See <http://www.imo.org/home.asp (Facilitation)> (Accessed on 28 July 2006) 
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4.5.1 The 1973 Amendments 
 
Before this 1973 amendment was incorporated, any amendment to the Convention 
required two-thirds acceptance of the Contracting Governments to enter into force.  
The increasing number of Contracting Governments makes it difficult to achieve the 
required two-thirds acceptance. Thus, to solve the problem, the ‘tacit acceptance’ 
was introduced where any amendment to the FAL Convention 1965 will enter into 
force on a predetermined date as long as it is not explicitly rejected by certain 
number or percentage of the Contracting Governments 181 . However, this 1973 
amendment, bound by the previous original amendment procedure took more than 
ten years i.e. on 2 June 1984 to enter into force. During this period of ten years, there 
was no other new proposal for amendments undertaken by the FAL Committee. 
Subsequently, as soon as this amendment entered into force, the FAL Committee 
then met to do all the other necessary and pending ‘package of amendments’ to the 
Convention to ‘reflect even current practice’. 
 
4.5.2 The 1986 Amendments 
 
The 1986 Amendments was aimed at permitting the use of automatic data processing 
(ADP) and other modern communications techniques. Entering into force on 1 
October 1986, it allows the usage of EDI, which basically means ‘computers talk to 
each other directly’. The introduction of EDI increases business efficiency as well 
greater flexibility and faster access to information. Total number of staff required 
doing certain tasks, like keying-in data and the need for constantly making telephone 
calls, such as to track the whereabouts of cargo, were reduced. Despite its advantages, 
EDI is not as popular as it is forecasted to be. One of the apparent reasons is that lack 
of common language and standards, which are absolutely required to allow the 
                                                 
181 This new amendment procedure is being incorporated into most of the IMO technical conventions 
for instance MARPOL 73/78. Further reading on ‘tacit acceptance procedures’ are available at 
<http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?header=false&topic_id=148&doc_id=637#tacit> 
(Accessed on 25 July 2006) 
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computers to ‘talk’ directly182. But this setback was later being resolved by the 
introduction of EDIFACT 183 , which universalized and standardized computer 
language in 1987184. Commencing then, shipping companies as well as others in the 
industry have properly accepted EDI, using EDIFACT and the European customs 
authorities agreed on the EDIFACT standard paperless trading.  
 
4.5.3 The 1987 Amendments 
 
Entered in force 1 January 1989, the Convention was amended to upgrade a number 
of recommended practices to standards. Standard 2.3.4 requires public authorities to 
accept a cargo manifest instead of the Cargo Declaration and standard 2.6.1 makes 
the contents of Crew List simpler where public authorities shall not call for more 
than the name and nationality of the ship, family name, given names, rank or rating, 
date and place of birth, nature and number of identity document, port and date of 
arrival, and arriving from. There are other amendments also which address the issue 
of facilitating the arrival and departure of ships engaged in disaster relief work, 
pollution combating operations and similar activities, which undoubtedly required 
speedy operations. 
 
4.5.4 The May 1990 Amendments 
 
These amendments entered into force on 1 September 1991, also under the ambit of 
tacit acceptance procedure. These amendments revised and added several 
                                                 
182 Felding S. E., “The Use of Electronic Data Interchange for Clearance Purpose” – In Seminar on 
Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, London: IMO, 1989, pp. 3-4. 
183 Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport agreed during a meeting 
organised by the United Nations. Further reading, see: 
<http://www.unece.org/trade/untdid/sitemap.htm> (Accessed on 26 July 2006) 
184 Hayes T.P., “Customs and Trade Facilitation in an Electronic Age” – In World Wide Shipping, vol. 
52, no. 4, (1989), pp. 15 – 18. 
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recommended practices including the issue of stowaways185  and the traffic flow 
arrangements.  
 
4.5.5 The 1992 Amendments 
 
The 1992 amendments incorporated an addition of a new section dealing with EDP 
and EDI and other changes with regards to private gift packages and trade samples, 
consular formalities and fees, submission of pre-import information, clearance of 
specialized equipment and forged documents. Entered into force on 1 September 
1993, the amendments also restructured the annex of the Convention to bring it in 
sequence with the subsequent provisions of the ICAO Convention. 
 
4.5.6 The 1993 amendments 
 
Several amendments were undertaken in 1993, which eventually entered into force 
on 1 June 1994. Noting the complication faced by the masters and owners in 
disembarking stowaways from ships, the Convention has been amended to handle the 
issue with regard to stowaways186.  
 
 
 
                                                 
185 A stowaway is a person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the 
ship, without the consent of the shipowner or the master or any other responsible person and who is 
detected on board the ship after it has departed from a port, or in the cargo while unloading it in the 
port of arrival, and is reported as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate authorities. For instance, 
there were 545 reported cases of stowaway cases involving 2253 stowaways in 1999 (Average 
number per incident was four). Latest reports on stowaways’ incidents to IMO can be found at the 
IMO website: <http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14408/94.pdf > 
(Accessed on 7 August 2006) 
186 This amendment can be considered a landmark achievement of the FAL Convention, as the issue 
of stowaways has not been resolved internationally as there is no single international convention that 
is in force to deal with it. The 1957 International Convention Relating to Stowaways was adopted in 
Brussels during a conference but it has never secured adequate signatories to enable it to enter into 
force. Looking at the time frame of this almost 60 years Convention, it is very unlikely that it will ever 
enter into force. 
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4.5.7 The 2002 Amendments 
 
This is one of the most pertinent amendments, which was adopted nearly five months, 
i.e. 10 January 2002 and entered into force on 1 May 2003, after the 9/11 attacks 
against the U.S. The amendments further add new standards and recommended 
practices for dealing with stowaways. Another amendment is also undertaken to FAL 
Form 7 – Dangerous Goods Manifest187, where it is reflected as a basic document for 
public authorities to be informed on the dangerous goods on board when checking on 
those dangerous goods on board ships. This new FAL Form adds up the number of 
standard forms used by ships on arrival at ports to seven, i.e. FAL Form 1 – General 
Declaration, FAL Form 2 – Cargo Declaration, FAL Form 3 – Ship’s Stores 
Declaration, FAL Form 4 – Crew’s Effects Declaration, FAL Form 5 – Crew List, 
FAL Form 6 – Passenger List (if any) and FAL Form 7 – the new Dangerous Goods 
Manifest. 
 
4.5.8 The 2005 Amendments 
 
Intended to modernize the Convention, the 2005 amendments created on 7 July 2005 
and will enter into force on 1 November 2006 include the following: - 
(a) Recommended practices: - 
(i) for public authorities to have necessary mechanism in place to ensure 
that information relayed prior to arrival and departure could be 
utilized towards facilitation and thus expediting the release and 
clearance of cargo and crew; and 
(ii) An establishment of a focal point so that all required information 
could be directed to instead of sending to several points, which means 
duplication.  
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(b) information to be transmitted electronically for expedited communication 
and to save paper;  
(c) security related measures were introduced, with special reference to ISPS 
Code and SOLAS Chapter XI-2, in the Standards and Recommended 
Practices; and 
(d) IMO Standardized FAL Forms (1 to 7) to be amended.  
 
4.6 Other international conventions on facilitation 
 
UNCTAD together with other international organizations especially the WCO, have 
accepted a number of facilitation-oriented agreements and conventions, among them 
are:-  
 
4.6.1 International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of 
Customs Procedures, 1973 (Kyoto Convention) 
 
As said before, among the most important problem the shipping industry is facing are 
those related to customs procedures and documentations. It had been noted that the 
movements of goods had become expansive to both carriers and shippers because of 
excessive customs procedures and documentations, which were having some serious 
negative impacts on the smooth flowing of the international trade. Thus, in order to 
solve this problem, the CCoC188 drafted and adopted the International Convention on 
the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, which is also known 
as the Kyoto Convention. It came into force on September 1975 and number of 
contracting parties as of 1 August 2006 is 50 countries as Appendix F.189 
                                                                                                                                          
187 The manifest includes references to the relevant provisions of SOLAS 1974 Chapter VII (Carriage 
of Dangerous Good) and the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code, which require 
the completion of a Dangerous Goods List or Manifest. 
188 Customs Cooperation Council later changed its name to World Customs Organization. 
189 See <http://www.unece.org/trade/kyoto/ky-01-e0.htm> (Accessed on 30 July 2006) 
 66
 This Convention was divided into two main parts; 19 Articles and sets of annexes. 
As most of other technical convention, the articles of this Convention only set out the 
scope, structure, and administrative matters. The most important is the annexes of the 
Convention, which detailed out separate customs procedures and gave guidance for 
simplifying and harmonizing national customs formalities190. They initially cover the 
following areas: - aimed at the “reduction of excessive customs procedures” by 
“simplifying and harmonizing” the local customs traditions; among others:- 
(a) Customs formalities prior to the lodgment of goods declaration; 
(b) Clearance of imported goods for home use; 
(c) Origin of goods; 
(d) Exportation; 
(e) Procedures for suspension of payment of duty; 
(f) Special customs procedures; and 
(g) Customs external relations191. 
 
Being seen as one of the most useful customs procedures, the Kyoto Convention has 
been an instrument of modernization to the customs procedures worldwide. Series of 
amendments to the Convention have been undertaken to bring it up-to-date to the 
current situation. The new revised Kyoto Convention has entered into force on 3 
February 2006 and it is widely regarded as a “blueprint for modern and efficient 
customs procedures in the 21st Century192. 
 
                                                 
190 Ibid Alorsor, pp. 49-51. 
191 Ibid Kouassivi, pp. 9-10. 
192 Based on the press release by WCO, Brussels, 3 August 2006. For more information, see WCO 
website: <http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/en.html> (Accessed on 7 August2006) 
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4.6.2 Customs Convention on Containers, 1972 
 
Chapter 2 has enumerated in detail on the introduction of containerization, which has 
revolutionized the shipping industry. Though widely welcomed as one of the most 
efficient means of carrying general cargo, containerization was always the subject of 
a tug of war between both shipowners and customs authorities193. An extension to the 
world wide use of the first customs container drawn in 1956 by the members off 
Economic Community of Europe (ECE), the CCC 72 was also being placed under 
the administration of CCoC. Objectives of CCC 72 were to develop and facilitate 
international carriage of containers following the introduction of the containerization. 
As said earlier, it should be noted that containers have been causing a rift between 
customs whether to regard them as part of the cargo or separate unit. Different way 
of treating them lead to different kinds of implication; economically and legally. 
Thus the Convention sought to solve this kind of misinterpretation so that the world 
shipping is not being slowed down with this simple yet important matter. 
 
4.6.3 International Convention on Multimodal Transport of Goods, 1982 
 
The United Nations Convention on Multimodal Transport of Goods, 1982 was 
adopted on 24 May 1980194. Not yet entered into force and the writer doubts that it 
will eventually enter into force based on the fact that it has been adopted more than 
26 years ago, the Convention did provide some basis on the facilitation of 
international maritime traffic, where it provides, among others, “the need to stimulate 
the development of smooth, economic and efficient multimodal transport service 
adequate to the requirements of the trade concerned” and “the need to facilitate 
                                                 
193 See  
<http://www.unece.org/trans/conventn/ccc_1972e.pdf#search='customs%20convention%20on%20con
tainers> (Accessed on 7 August 2006) 
194 The Convention was adopted following the United Nations Conference on the Convention on 
International Multimodal Transport, held in Geneva from 12 to 30 November 1979 and from 8 to 24 
May 1980. For the complete text of the Convention, see 
<http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.multimodal.transport.1980/doc.html> (Accessed on 9 Aug 2006) 
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customs procedures with the consideration to the problems of transit countries”195. 
A major objective of the multimodal transport operations is to facilitate door-to-door 
transport of goods on a single transport document. It makes provisions for simpler 
customs procedures due to one single transport document. It is seen as “manifestation 
of the international community’s effort to make all countries enjoy the benefits of 
technological advances being made in transport and distribution”196. 
 
 
                                                 
195 Selected preamble of the Convention on International Multimodal Transport, 1982. 
196 Ibid Alorsor, p. 54. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE TWIN GOALS: SECURITY AND FACILITATION 
 
 
 “Within a few days, as we saw the effect of Level One alert at our 
borders, I also realised that we needed to develop a strategy to secure the 
movement of trade to the U.S., but to do so without unduly impeding the 
flow of trade that is so important to our, and the world’s, economy. That is 
to say, we needed a strategy to accomplish what I have referred to as our 
Twin Goals: Security AND Facilitation” 
 
- Robert C. Bonner,  
Former Commissioner, US Customs and Border Protection  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The writer has extensively discussed the risks of terrorist related activities that exist 
in, around and relating to the entire network of the supply chain in Chapter 2. As said 
before, the supply chain can be broadly defined as all the processes and procedures 
undertaken to ensure that goods (and services) reach its final destination; i.e. end 
users or consumers who would eventually end up paying for it. There are 
undoubtedly risks along these supply chains and the writer has also discussed in 
details in Chapter 3 on the worldwide measures undertaken by the IMO and the 
biggest trading nation; the US to mitigate such risks.  
 
In this fifth chapter, the writer seeks to examine positive and negative relationships 
between those maritime security measures and the quest to facilitate the efficiency of 
international maritime trade; and then try to look for some acceptable balances of 
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both in order not to be prejudicial of one against the other. The importance of 
‘smooth movement of commodities from one port to the other has been the real basis 
for peaceful development of economies from ancient time till present day’ must never 
be disregard197.  
 
It should be noted, as said before, prior to Sept. 11, 2001, stakeholders when 
discussing about freight transportation security had primarily focused on means and 
mechanisms on how to control those freights of thefts and pilferage as well as to 
reduce the illegal introduction and entry of contraband items such as drugs, firearms, 
illegal immigrants, etc. into the country. Save for 9/11 catastrophe has altered the 
whole paradigm of this security outlook. Immediately after the attack, there were 
some ‘acceptable and inevitable’ disruptions of trade flow, yet additional friction 
trading cost due to tighter security measures seemingly affected trade worldwide198.  
 
One of them is freight security, which is now been viewed as to secure that freight 
from falling into the hands of terrorists either to use it as an arsenal of attacks or 
utilise it to finance their operations. Nevertheless, do the security concerns would be 
a trade-off to the flourishing international maritime trade that we are having now. 
There were also rising concerns over the financial costs versus the security benefits 
and its effect of trade efficiency199. The Booz Allen Hamilton security war game 
mentioned earlier in Chapter 2 clearly unfolded the challenges of striking an intricate 
balance between security and efficiency200. Accordingly, how best can we achieve 
the dual objectives of “global maritime security” and “global trade facilitation and 
efficiency”.  
                                                 
197 Inoue S., “Port Security and Trade Facilitation” – In Shipping Finance Annual 2004/2005, Crisell 
M. (ed.), United Kingdom: Wyndeham Grange Ltd, p. 47. 
198  OECD, no. 35, June 2005, The Impact of Sept. 11 on Trade, available online at 
<http://www.oecdwash.org/NEWS/LOCAL/oecdwash-
jun2002.pdf#search='the%20impact%20of%20the%20terrorist%20attacks%20of%2011%20septembe
r%202001%20on%20international%20trading%20and%20transport%20activities> (Accessed on 20 
August 2006)   
199 Ibid Shie, p. 24. 
200 Starr R. & Bahr N., “Meeting the Growing Port Security Needs of a more Dangerous World” – In 
Port Technology International, 21st ed., spring 2004, London: Henley Publishing Ltd., p. 171. 
 71
 Stakeholders be it public or private believe that with the right strategies and tactics, 
security related risks can and able to be reduced and simultaneously contributed 
greatly to the productivity and effectiveness of the whole network of supply chain. 
But what are then the right strategies and tactics? How to deal with all these security 
challenges effectively without jeopardizing the importance of allowing the free flow 
of the legitimate trade. In other simple words, how can we best stop illegitimate trade 
without causing any disruption (or at least inflicting minimal problem) to genuine 
trade? H. L. Lee and M. Wolfe in their article entitled “Supply Chain without Tears” 
speak in detail of the feasible means to address the issue of supply chain security 
while having in mind the need to facilitate the international maritime trade. Both Lee 
and Wolfe suggested the adoption of the “1970’s and 1980’s Quality Revolution”, 
the “Win-win Situation” and the application of both concepts into the supply chain 
security to achieve the dual objectives of supply chain security and supply chain 
efficiency201. 
 
5.2 The 1970’s and 1980’s Quality Revolution 
 
Back in 1970’s and the 80’s, the drive for quality started as the “best way of ensuring 
customer loyalty, the best defence against foreign competition and the only way to 
secure continuous growth and profits in difficult market conditions”202. This quality 
movement gave the notion that defects (not doing things right at the first place) can 
be very costly to a company203. Defective products (or unsatisfactory services) in the 
market can lead to yet another failures which usually termed as “external failure 
costs or non-conformance costs”, i.e. unable to process customer’s expectation, 
increased liability, products recall, repair, payment of damages, affecting negatively 
                                                 
201 Lee H. L. and Wolfe M., “Supply Chain without Tears” – In Supply Chain Management Review, 
January/February 2003, pp 12-20. Available online at: 
<http://www.maritimesecurityexpo.com/whitepaperarticles/Security%20Without%20Tears%20SCM0
333security.pdf> (Accessed on 14 August 2006).  
202 Munro-Faure L and Munro-Faure M., Implementing Total Quality Management, London: Pitman 
Publishing, 1992, p. 1. 
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on any future sales, and even in some instances, might cause catastrophic effects to 
the society. All these associated costs being put together would eventually end up 
being higher than the cost of the product itself204. Thus, the quest towards achieving 
higher improvement of quality becomes paramount205. Though requiring “patience 
and continuous, steady effort” 206 , industries soon embrace into what is usually 
termed as TQM. It is a process of ensuring: 
 
The maximum effectiveness and efficiency of everything that is done 
within on organization. It provides market and sector leadership, by the 
establishment of processes and systems which promote excellence; 
prevent errors and waste without duplication, and ensures that every 
aspect of the organization is aligned to the needs of both the external and 
internal customer207.  
 
To achieve high quality standards, a total organizational focus must be adopted. 
Everybody in an organization must know the imperativeness of quality. It is the sole 
responsibility of the quality control department or quality supervisor. It should be 
regarded as the responsibility of all in the organization. The best way to ensure high 
quality in the first instance is to prevent defect from happening at the time the 
product (or service) being produced. It is more like a preventive strategy, which 
                                                                                                                                          
203 Ibid, Munro-Faure L and Munro-Faure M, pp. 26-32. 
204  According to Munro-Faure L and Munro-Faure M, these associated costs of product/service 
failures can amount to 25 percent of actual turnover. 
205  Customers define quality. It is a key focal point of successful business nowadays. As a 
manufacturer (or service provider), you have to listen to customer’s requirements and then produce it 
at minimal cost. This has been the driving force of the Japanese industry since the end of World War 
II and they have proven that they are as superior as their Western counterparts. Few books illustrated 
on the Japanese drive for quality contributed to their success, among others, Munro-Faure L and 
Munro-Faure M., Implementing Total Quality Management, Cohen S. and Brand R., Total Quality 
Management in Government: a Practical Guide for the Real World, Joyce M. E., How to Lead your 
Business beyond TQM: Making World Class Performance a Reality. 
206 Cohen S. and Brand R., Total Quality Management in Government: a Practical Guide for the Real 
World, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1993, p. 8 
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emphasizes, inter alia, on education, design improvements and accountability of the 
total company. Moving from there, we can espouse the same principle in adapting 
supply chain security measures. Security should be imbedded into the total 
organization and ensure that it is the responsibility of everybody; top to bottom or 
vice versa along the supply chain. By so doing, security related breaches can be 
prevented and will eventually contribute to a more cost effective preventive, 
controlling and improvement aspects. This will eventually create more confidence to 
the supply chain security, which will contribute greatly to the free flow of maritime 
trade. Table 3 below illustrates in brief on key aspects of quality and how best can it 
be fitted into the supply chain security initiatives.   
 
Table 4: Quality and Supply Chain Security 
 
Quality and Supply Chain Security 
Quality Security Initiatives 
Defects are very costly Security gaps create big risks 
Total Quality Management Involvement gaps of all stakeholders 
Emphasis on prevention C-TPAT, sealing and anti-tamper technologies 
Source inspection CSI and source inspection 
Process control Automated chain of custody 
Identify, track, and improve quality Container tracking and total visibility 
Root cause analysis 
Profiling system for shipments, shipper, carriers, 
trade routes 
“Quality is free” 
Higher productivity with supply chain security 
and confidence 
Source: Lee and Wolfe 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
207 Joyce M. E., How to Lead your Business beyond TQM: Making World Class Performance a 
Reality, London: Pitman Publishing, 1995, p. 4 
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5.3 The Win-win situation 
 
Towards realising the “win-win situation” where security measures and trace 
facilitation could be achieved hand in hand, it is feasible to also look both in the light 
of maintaining quality. In security measures implementation and trade facilitation 
aspects, there are two main actors who play the most important roles. They are more 
often than not intersected with one another. “What do security officials actually 
require from supply chain managers and vice versa”? Ideally, having those 
responsible for facilitation of maritime trade thinking of security and those 
responsible for security thinking about facilitation would result an improved efforts 
directed at ensuring safe, orderly and efficient maritime transport. Those holding 
responsibilities of both security and facilitation such as immigration, customs 
authorities and the coast guards must be able to have a broad overview and must 
consistently aware of both aspects; security and facilitation in addition to their 
primary roles. This is where the most important perspectives come into pictures: 
security measures perspective and trade facilitation and efficiency perspective. The 
maritime security initiatives discussed in the previous chapter have given us idea on 
what the “security managers” actually required to do; i.e. protecting the ships and 
cargo being abused to facilitate the work of the terrorists. And in order to guarantee 
such elements not being abused to materialise the terrorists’ ends, security managers 
need to ensure that these elements are protected by undertaking the following: - 
(a) ensure the integrity of conveyance loading, documentation and sealing; 
(b) reduce significantly the risk of tampering in transit which also ultimately 
means that the ships and crew on board need to be secured; and 
(c) Timely information about shipment; especially in this era of e-business.      
  
The writer has also discussed in the previous chapter the need to facilitate maritime 
trade. To be effective in doing so, the “supply chain managers” have to work 
together with the security managers by carrying out the following:- 
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(a) committed to processing and inspecting qualifying shipments in ways that 
permit highly reliable and predictable processing times for those companies 
that adhere to the best security practices and standards; 
(b) protect all commercial information given to authorities; this includes  
protection from Freedom-of-Information and tort disclosure; 
(c) harmonise and standardise security processes internationally and 
domestically; and 
(d) Create security and anti-tampering practices that are by-products of 
excellent supply chain processes and activities.  
 
This will ultimately lead to better visibility and control through all supply chain 
processes and activities. Security consciousness must be there at the beginning, 
during and after each measure.208 These seven requirements would enable the supply 
chain managers and security managers to assess the effectiveness of any supply chain 
measures that being adopted in terms of effectiveness to deal with the issue of 
security of supply chain and facilitation of maritime trade.  
 
5.4 The application of technology 
 
In the age of technological advancement, it is highly feasible to balance the need of 
enhancing security and at the same times not choking the free flow of legitimate 
trade. By way of example, a particularly important trade facilitation measure is the 
‘Single Window’ concept209. The usage of this single window concept can generate 
headway in the implementation of transport and trade facilitation initiatives while 
contributing greatly in a more secure maritime business environment. 
                                                 
208 Sheffi Y., “Supply Chain Management under the Threat of International Terrorism” – In Supply 
Chain Management Review, vol. 12, no. 2, 2001, available online at 
<http://esd.mit.edu/staging/HeadLine/Terrorism-%20Sheffi-
IJLM.pdf#search='supply%20chain%20management%20under%20the%20threat%20of%20internatio
nal%20terrorism'> (Accessed on 17 August 2006) 
209 Further information on a single window concept is available at the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE), <http://www.unece.org/cefact/recommendations/rec33/rec33_trd352e.pdf> 
(Accessed on 20 August 2006)  
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 Containers, which play the major part of the international maritime trade, have its 
key shortfalls. Former US CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner described containers in 
the following manner: “They’re as dumb as a fence post, so we just want to make 
them smarter210”. The technological boom has made possible for the development 
and the use of the smarter container or what usually referred to as “Smart Box”. It is 
a smarter and more secure container that is, at a minimum, tamper-evident211. The 
integration of Smart Box into the supply chain security and logistic will facilitate 
trade in the sense that it will expedite cargo checking and clearance as it is allows 
immediate but secured access. The “green lane cargo” due to its expedited checking 
and clearance unquestionably will result in a significant financial and competitive 
edge for exporters. As it is more secured, the Smart Box also additionally reduces 
pilferage and provides more efficient and more predictable supply chain.  
 
5.5 Learning from U.S. experience: prevention at the source 
 
After 9/11, there are mass proliferation of supply chain security measures ranging 
from the protection of cargo, ports and seafarers from becoming the victims of the 
acts of terrorisms. Heightened security requirements have also led to some 
suggestions, among others, to increase the inspection rate to containers from the 
present 2 percent to 10 percent. It means that out of 15,000,000 containers worldwide, 
1,500,000 would be subject to thorough check. In U.S. seaports alone, out of 9.5 
million containers arrived (an average 26,000 a day), 950,000 or almost 2,600 a day 
would need to be scrutinised212.  
 
                                                 
210 Further information, see: <http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2005/nov_dec/technology.xml> 
(Accessed on 20 August 2006) 
211  Methods on how the concept of Smart Box are applied can be assessed at: 
<http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2005/nov_dec/technology.xml> (Accessed on 20 August 
2006) 
212 Excerpts from the CSI Fact Sheet by the U.S. CBP dated 29 March 2006, 
<http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_fact_sheet.ctt/c
si_fact_sheet.doc> (Accessed on 21 August 2006)  
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Looking at the first glance, this suggestion would be detrimental to trade facilitation 
in general. By putting aside the cost of purchasing a container scanner machine213 
and the rate of examining per container214, the scrutinising of 1,500,000 containers 
would create several adverse implications or what usually expressed as the “domino 
effect”215; one piece falls after the other. First, there will be port and terminals 
congestion, which will eventually reduce the productivity of terminal operations and 
transportations expenses. Second, such inspections and congestion would slow the 
flow of cargo, extension of delivery times, and decreases the reliability of shipments. 
Thirdly, as awaiting inspections, there might be some cargo that has landed that may 
contain WMD. It will thus offset the value of security inspections216.  
 
In the previous discussion, the writer has highlighted the adoption of quality 
consciousness into security awareness in order to gain both security benefits and 
trade efficiency. As said before, if we necessitate to avoiding product flaw, we have 
to ensure the quality of the product at the time it was manufactured and the same 
principle applies to security of supply chain. Security measures are part of the 
preventive and controlling process. Thus, take the CSI and C-TPAT for example, 
both prevents and eliminates risks at its sources. We always hear a saying 
“prevention is better than cure” or “nip in the bud”. This is what all security 
measures such s CSI and C-TPAT is all about. If we want to eliminate inspection that 
will have some serious adverse implications on the trade flow, we have to make sure 
                                                 
213 The USCG Port Security Assessment: Best Practices Bulletin, the initial cost of purchasing a 
container scanner varies depending on type, size and model. It is estimated that the cost per container 
would be at least USD2 million and the maintaining and training cost could also be considerable. 
Further information, see: <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/mp/pdf/Best%20Practice%20-
%20Tunisia%20hundred%20percent%20x-
ray%20screening.pdf#search='container%20screening%20cost'> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)  
214 According to a Pakistan newspaper report, the rate of scanning per container would cost exporters 
around USD5 for a 20feet container and USD10 for 40feet container. The report is available online at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/2004/05/24/nat13.htm> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)  
215 This theory was basically the U.S. foreign policy theory during the Cold War that if one land falls 
into the influence of Communism, the land or country within its vicinity would also follow in domino 
effect. The domino effect indicates that some change, small in itself, will cause a similar change 
nearby, which then will cause another similar change, and so on in linear sequence, by analogy to a 
falling row of dominoes standing on end.   
216 Ibid Lee and Wolfe, p.14. 
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that the risk is prevented or controlled where it starts. CSI, when first being 
introduced back in 2002, was not entirely welcomed by the countries because it is 
said to be not entirely voluntary where if a country wanted to export to the U.S., it 
must sign up. Yet, despite glaring economic problem and financial application, many 
countries have signed up for CSI.  
 
It should be further noted that containerization is the primary system of the global 
trade where it has revolutionised the world’s maritime trading system. The US CBP 
based on the statement of its former Commissioner Bonner, claimed that the 
strategies adopted to enhance security did not only securing the supply chain against 
the threat of terrorism but it also “actually facilitate the movement of trade”. How the 
US experience in the enhancement of maritime security and at the same time making 
sure that maritime trade is further facilitated. On that note, the main four interrelated 
initiatives: the 24-Hour Rule, the NTC, the CSI and C-TPAT are investigated. 
Designed to meet the goals of enhancing security and facilitation of international 
maritime trade, these initiatives manipulated the usage of technology, advanced 
information, extended boarder concept and public-private partnership217. 
 
As discussed before, these maritime security initiatives such as the 24-Hour Rule 
allow the CBP to obtain advance electronic information on all cargo shipped to the 
US 24 hours before the cargo is loaded in foreign seaports. Then the ATS and the 
NTC allow the containers to be evaluated for terrorists risk before they are loaded or 
shipped to the US ports. The third initiatives i.e. the CSI, allow the CBP to identify 
through automated risk targeting, and inspect high-risk containers before they are 
loaded on board vessels heading to the US and finally C-TPAT which is usually 
termed as public-private partnership increased the supply chain security. 
 
                                                 
217 Bonner R., “From Cold War to war on terror: Security and Facilitation of Global Trade in the Post-
9/11 Era” – In BIMCO Review 2005, Denmark: Book Production Consultant plc, p. 174-175. 
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Just as the 24-Hour Rule become effective as it promotes timeliness and accuracy218, 
the need to push even further the 24-Hour becomes paramount. To achieve better 
visibility along the supply chain, we can better improve the facilitation where 
Advance Trade Data Initiative would be applied to get additional information. Based 
on strategic alliance, the risk of terrorism would be better managed. These allow 
managing the risk of terrorist by zeroing in on any suspect shipments and performing 
all necessary security inspections at the earliest possible points in the supply chain. 
This do not hamper the free flow of the trade as it will only target the suspected 
shipment that may pose potential risk than having to check all the shipment which 
will eventually cause unnecessary delays. Undoubtedly, this means fewer inspections 
would be carried out and further facilitates international maritime trade. 
 
5.6 Global maritime strategy and facilitation 
 
Apart from that, the USCG working together with the IMO is bestowed to protect the 
security of commercial ocean-going vessels and seaports all around the world via the 
ISPS Code programme and these has also contributed greatly in securing maritime 
trade and trading system as well as playing a significant role in achieving the overall 
strategy of security and facilitation of the global trade219. It is without doubt almost a 
utopia to have a single global maritime strategy. But in order to deal with global 
maritime challenges, we need to go beyond our national strategy and quest to adopt a 
global maritime strategy220. First of all, we have to see what we have on the table and 
try to connect all these piecemeal. And only then would we be able to come out with 
something workable. 
 
                                                 
218 Garcia B. R. and Prince T., “Supply Chain Manifesto” – In Containerization International 
(Regional Review), September 2005, p. 5, London: T & F Informa UK Ltd. 
219 Caplis J., “Global Maritime Security” – In Journal of Safety and Security at Sea: the Coast Guard 
Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council, vol. 63, no. 1, Spring 2006, Arlington: USCG, 
2006, p. 6. 
220 Ibid Inoue, p. 48. 
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As we look at the 24-Hour Rule, the CSI, C-TPAT or AIS, even these are US 
creation, it still have worldwide application because as said before the U.S. is the 
epicentre of world trade and those countries which wanted to trade with the U.S. 
have to comply with this rule, like it or not. The WCO also plays a leading and more 
active role in this effort by including the C-TPAT within its framework of standards 
to facilitate and secure trade. Being represented by almost worldwide customs 
administration of 169 countries which representing almost 99 percent of world trade, 
WCO is seen as the best solution towards facilitation of trade and security with the 
assistance of other agencies and stakeholders in supply chain. With that kind of 
cooperation, security concern could make customs procedures more efficient and 
effective, thus benefit trade facilitation as well221. Inherently, the launching of the 
WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade222 in June 2005 
should be viewed as WCO 21st Century capacity building initiative 223 . The 
Framework focuses on ensuring close customs-to-customs cooperation and 
establishing solid customs-to-business partnership relations. It concentrates on four 
main areas, specifically “the harmonization of advance electronic cargo information 
requirements for inbound, outbound and transit shipments; the implementation of a 
consistent risk management approach to address security threats; the definition 
of benefits to businesses that meet minimal supply chain security standards and best 
practice; and mandatory outbound inspection of high-risk containers upon reasonable 
request by the member receiving the cargo”224. 
 
5.7 Final remarks 
 
Security measures and facilitation aspects of shipping are two concepts apparently 
opposing to each other and the relationship between these two dichotomies have 
                                                 
221 UNCTAD, Trade and Transport Facilitation: Building a Secure and Efficient Environment for 
Trade, TD/L.387, 17 June 2004. 
222 Available online at: <http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/en.html> (Accessed on 21 August 2006)  
223 World Customs Organization – In Port Technology International, 30th ed., summer 2006, London: 
Henley Media House, p. 158. 
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been extensively discussed. However, stakeholders worldwide have generally agreed 
that a sound and practical balance between these two security and facilitation 
requirements is indispensable. Security instruments that led to the improvement in 
the security consciousness have been given considerable efficient effect on trade 
facilitation. The FAL Committee of IMO, for instance, has accordingly strengthened 
the convention relating to the facilitation of international maritime traffic by 
amending and including new standards and recommended practices to allow for 
tighter security regarding narcotics control, stowaways, illegal immigrants or 
undesirable persons, piracy, procedures in ports, fraud and other safety and 
emergency measures. Apart from the IMO, it is also worth mentioning that the 
shipping industry has taken these problems seriously and the response is seen to be 
encouraging (such as the ICS drug guide, piracy initiative and other measures)225.  
 
Further, the active involvement of WCO in this would be supplementary to facilitate 
the flow of global trade as there will be uniformity in the standards of security so that 
all nations would be able to work together under the same standards to ensure the 
core security standards without prejudicing the need to facilitate global trade. 
Maritime security initiatives are being developed to prevent and deter any 
exploitation of global terrorism. But no matter how good these measures are, it still 
need to have  a back-up system or what usually called as contingency plan so that 
“Just-in-Case” the attack happened, the trade flow would not be a standstill for a  
long times, where trade can start business with minimal disruptions 226 . In 
implementing any security measures should be carried out efficiently to minimise 
interference with and delay to maritime transport was emphasized. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
224  UNCTAD Report, Efficient Transport and Trade Facilitation to improve Participation by 
Developing Countries in International Trade, TD/B/COM.3/72, 9 January 2006, p. 12. 
225 Ibid Felding, p. 2. 
226 Martha J. and Subbakrishna S., “Targeting a Just-in-Case Supply Chain for the Inevitable Next 
Disaster” – In Supply Chain Management Review, 1 September 2002, available online at: 
<http://www.manufacturing.net/scm/article/CA243747.html?text="targeting+a+just-in-
case+supply+chain+for+the+inevitable+next+disaster"> (Accessed on 17 August 2006) 
 82
Diagram 2 below depicted that security measures been put in place to reduce the 
probability of the terrorist attacks. If no measures taken, the probability of attacks to 
occur would be higher and the expected cost to the society would also be high. But if 
the strong terrorist measures been put in place, the expected cost to the society would 
be lower. In order to decrease the possibility of terrorist attack, more resources need 
to be committed227.  
 
Diagram 2: The Cost of Terrorist Attack and anti-Terrorist Measures 
 
 
Source: Kerr 
 
“Free trade is the handmaiden to security”228. Such creation of level playing field in 
trade would enhance national economic and thus will contribute constructively 
towards strengthening global security regimes. The US National Security Strategy 
indicates: 
 
A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing 
prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth 
                                                 
227 Ibid Kerr, p. 5. 
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supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher 
incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of property, spurs 
economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it 
reinforces the habit of liberty. We will promote economic growth and 
economic freedom beyond America’s shores229. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
228 Ibid Carafano and Nguyen, p. 4. 
229 The White House, National Security Strategy for the United States of America, September 2002, p. 
17, available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION: FINAL REMARKS AND WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE 
 
 
“For these reasons and many others, port security and the broader 
concept of maritime security cannot be reduced to a single threat vector, a 
single vulnerability, a specific location, or a single unifying legal theory. 
Maritime security impacts, and is impacted by, an interwoven system of 
national interests, legal frameworks, economic structures, intermodal 
transportation systems, and the environment. Because of that, the maritime 
security equation cannot be based upon a specific threat or vulnerability. It 
is more than container security, supply chain assurance, vessel borne 
improvised explosive devices, waterfront facilities, or vessels” 
 
- Admiral Thad W. Allen 
Commandant of the US Coast guard 
 
 
6.1 National security v. trade: a conclusion 
 
Article XXI – Security Exceptions of the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade230 
clearly stipulated that: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed… (b) to 
prevent any contracting party from taking any action which is necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests…(iii) taken in time of war or other 
emergency in international relations;231” Looking at this angle, striking a balance 
                                                 
230 Typically abbreviated GATT was originally created by the Bretton Woods Conference as part of a 
larger plan for economic recovery after World War II. GATT included a reduction of tariffs and other 
international trade barriers and is generally considered the precursor of the World Trade Organization. 
Further information on GATT is available at <http://www.wto.org/> (Accessed on 20 August 2006) 
231  Full text of GATT 1947 (as amended through 1966) is available online at 
<http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/trade/GATT.html> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)  
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between maritime security and trade profitability seems to be one of the greatest 
challenges in the process of globalisation. The UN views international trade 
development not as an end in itself but rather as a vehicle through which economic 
development and poverty alleviation may be achieved232. However, trade itself can 
potentially pose threats to the good order of society and everything possible must be 
done to secure the economies against such threats.  
 
There is no single ‘silver bullet’ to deal with the issue of maritime security 
effectively and efficiently. This formidable task requires deep coordination and 
intense work of national agencies and international community to ensure that the 
required security on the supply chain to be achieved. Those maritime security 
measures, be it MTSA 2002, C-TPAT, CSI, PSI, ISPS Code  or the SUA 2005 are 
significant steps in the right direction to assist in reducing the vulnerability of 
maritime sectors from terrorist attacks. At this particular moment, the best approach 
that can be adopted is to manage those risks related to the maritime trade and to 
address the issues of particular concern, such as the dichotomy between maritime 
security measures and trade facilitation on a priority basis. The terrorist attacks on or 
suing the supply chain could occur everywhere, and a well-planned attack could 
result in significant loss of life. We must bear in mind that ‘Security must be 
embedded into, not bolted upon’.  
 
It is imperative to emphasise that the need to strengthen security within the 
worldwide maritime trading system presented a unique opportunity to enhance 
overall trade processes in such a way as to increase both security and trade 
facilitation. Supply chain efficiency and security are distinct but interconnected and 
any efforts to secure trade should try to minimise the potential negative side effects 
on the economy and should also ensure that no specific country or group is excluded.  
                                                 
232 Terrorism is often seen as a direct result of poverty and ignorance. Some argue that it is the only 
effective means for those in want to express their needs and grievances. However, such arguments 
remain unsubstantiated and to some degree, simply false. In fact, a significant number of the terrorists 
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6.2 What more must and can be done 
 
Finally, it is an inherent view that those in the ports, shipping and related industries, 
and even government officials, approach the security measures from a trade-
facilitation point of view, rather than from a security point of view. What this means 
is that many carry out their part in complying with the security measures simply 
because of the need to ensure that they can carry on trading as usual, while at the 
same time believing that the risks of terrorism have been exaggerated. This intrinsic 
perception should be reversed in order to confront the issues of trade efficiency and 
security in a more all-inclusive manner. Joseph Nye has said, “Security is like oxygen, 
you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is 
nothing else that you will think about”233. Thus, what more can or suppose to be done 
by countries in finding the right balance between maritime security and the need to 
facilitate maritime trade. The following six recommendations should be considered. 
 
6.2.1 Finding the right mix 
 
Leaders must embrace security as a strategic and necessary concept for global trade 
and develop an end-to-end approach to building global trade resilience, business 
models must evolve to embed security within the economics of the industry and it is 
essential to establish public-private sector partnerships and interfaces that facilitate 
cooperation for these security efforts. Finding the right mix will require rethinking of 
business and operating models for all participants, both public and private. All 
organisations must work more closely together, to be clear on where real value could 
be added to the process, and also to be clear that the solutions developed were 
practical, stable and can be easily implemented by the business community.  The 
main challenge was to facilitate the vast majority of international cargo movements 
                                                                                                                                          
involved in major attacks over the past several years have come from those relatively wealthy 
countries and upper-class families.   
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and passenger traffic as efficiently as possible while at the same time effectively 
dealing with the small percentage that may pose a threat to security. 
 
6.2.2 Rebuilt trust 
 
Security was not a new issue and industry had been defending cargo from criminal 
activities for many years. However, the threat as it is today, hailed from the trade 
itself. Much of the effort that has gone into trade facilitation over the past decades 
had been undone by the events of September 11th. There was now a need to rebuild 
trust in the trading system and this is the responsibility of all actors in the trade 
transaction chain. The need to look for equality in the approach to trade security 
across all modes of transport and the pragmatic and practical solutions that are 
appropriate to the threat should be emphasized.  
 
6.2.3 Training 
 
The world community should not respond to the political pressure to be seen to be 
doing something and that the measures must also meet the needs of industry. It was 
likely that security measures could cause trade distortions but that training of staff in 
developing countries could help offset this. WCO should play a more distinctive role 
in the security area, especially the refocusing on the need to collect export 
information. A pragmatic approach to trade facilitation and security are direly needed 
to avoid distortions and diversions. On that regard, WCO should devise a means to 
work together with the IMO to establish an international set of principles for trade 
facilitation and security. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
233 Nye J., “The Case for Deep Engagement” – In Foreign Affairs, July-August 1995. Available online 
at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19950701faessay5055/joseph-s-nye-jr/east-asian-security-the-case-
for-deep-engagement.html> (Accessed on 20 August 2006)  
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6.2.4 Standards among international organizations 
 
In the trade and security area, IMO, WCO and UNCTAD could work closely 
together in formulating a workable standard between these organizations. 
International trade and transport facilitation were considered within UNCTAD as 
tied to each other and that obstacles to transport would distort trade. Security had 
long been an issue for developing countries but had now reached the multilateral 
stage because it was now directly affecting developed economies. The key 
experience of UNCTAD was on trade facilitation implementation and not on security 
measures should be garnered further into the next level. The concept of developing a 
set of core UN principles to guide the development of trade facilitation and security 
initiatives for all organisations is also need to be ventured into. 
 
6.2.5 Role of WTO  
 
WTO should also play a more active role insofar as there were no WTO initiatives 
specifically addressing trade and security issues. The need to balance the facilitation 
of trade with the pursuit of legitimate control objectives is now persistent and urgent. 
Essentially, there is a need to combine the requirements and synergies of trade 
facilitation and security and advance information and risk management would be of 
primary importance in this regard. Any new approach to trade facilitation and 
security must cover other legitimate concerns, such as drugs enforcement, classical 
smuggling of all sorts, money laundering etc. There was a need to focus on capacity 
building and human resources development issues and finding synergies and 
avoiding duplication should always be prioritised. A concise review of all maritime 
security measures needs to be carried out to determine exactly who was doing what. 
Unnecessary costs should be avoided and the importance to realise that trade 
facilitation as an important element of economic development policy should also be 
emphasised. 
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6.2.6 R & D for new technologies 
 
At present, countries have to invest millions of dollars in order to acquire sensor or 
scanning technologies for detecting weapons or illegal shipments. As highlighted 
before in chapter 5, the initial cost of acquiring a single scanning machine under CSI 
can easily cost around USD2million. Thus, it is imperative for governments to focus 
their target, apart from committing a considerable amount of fund to finance the 
implementation of security measures, on the development of new technologies for 
low cost yet efficient detection technologies for remote scanning of explosives and 
radiation. These would provide more coordinated and valuable capabilities for better 
securing of container security shipment in particular. This development of new 
technologies must also take into consideration of the market requirements of the 
developing countries. 
 
6.3 Final remarks 
 
Finally whatever the scheme that the US or the world community adopt, the aim 
should be to achieve maximum security with the minimum disruption to trade. In this 
ambiguous security environment, upgrading of security should be balanced as not to 
unduly burden the maritime transport industry as security barriers are capable of 
easily becoming trade barriers. As pointed out by the former Commandant of the 
USCG, Admiral James Loy234: “To sustain prosperity, we open the gates. To ensure 
security, we close gates. We clearly need to get beyond the metaphor of an opened or 
closed gate.235” 
                                                 
234 Admiral James Milton Loy served as the Deputy Secretary of the US DHS from December 4, 2003 
to March 2005. Before that he was the Head of the USCG beginning May 1998 to 2002. Admiral 
Thomas H. Collins then succeeded him. 
235 Ibid The Economist, p. 67. 
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Appendix A 
 CSI Operational Ports – as on 29 March 2006 
 
1. In the Americas:  
• Montreal, Vancouver & Halifax, Canada  
• Santos, Brazil  
• Buenos Aires, Argentina  
• Puerto Cortes, Honduras 
 
2. In Europe:  
• Rotterdam, The Netherlands  
• Bremerhaven & Hamburg, Germany  
• Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium  
• Le Havre and Marseille, France  
• Gothenburg, Sweden  
• La Spezia, Genoa, Naples, Gioia Tauro, and Livorno, Italy  
• Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury, and Southampton, 
United Kingdom (U.K.)  
• Piraeus, Greece  
• Algeciras, Spain  
• Lisbon, Portugal 
 
3. In Asia and the East:  
• Singapore  
• Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe, Japan  
• Hong Kong  
• Pusan, South Korea  
• Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia  
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• Laem Chabang, Thailand  
• Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE)  
• Shenzhen and Shanghai  
• Kaohsiung  
• Colombo, Sri Lanka  
• Port Salalah, Oman 
 
4. In Africa:  
• Durban, South Africa 
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Appendix B 
Statement of Interdiction Principles 
 
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a 
more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of 
WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-
state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and 
relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They 
call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join 
in similarly committing to:  
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for 
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and 
related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation 
concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers 
to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish 
should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in 
proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, 
or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either 
selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related 
materials.  
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information 
concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential 
character of classified information provided by other states as part of this 
initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations 
and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in 
interdiction efforts.  
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where 
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when 
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necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to 
support these commitments.  
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of 
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national 
legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under 
international law and frameworks, to include:  
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or 
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to 
allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.  
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by 
another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their 
flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the 
territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of 
transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.  
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate 
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by 
other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such 
vessels that may be identified by such states.  
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal 
waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels 
that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from 
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such 
cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels 
entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that 
are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring 
that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such 
cargoes prior to entry.  
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e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by 
another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for 
inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) 
deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit 
rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.  
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment 
points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state 
actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other 
modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and 
to seize such cargoes that are identified.  
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FAL Convention Contracting Governments – as of 30 June 2006 
 
Albania Algeria Argentina 
Australia Austria Azerbaijan 
Bahamas Bangladesh Barbados 
Belgium Benin Brazil 
Bulgaria Burundi Cameroon 
Canada Cape Verde Chile 
China Colombia Congo 
Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba 
Cyprus Czech Republic Dem. People's Rep. Korea 
Denmark Dominica Dominican Republic 
Ecuador Egypt Estonia 
Fiji Finland France 
Gabon Gambia Georgia 
Germany Ghana Greece 
Guinea Guyana Honduras 
Hungary Iceland India 
Indonesia Iran (Islamic Republic of) Iraq 
Ireland Israel Italy 
Japan Jordan Latvia 
Lebanon Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar 
Mali Malta Marshall Islands 
Mauritius Mexico Monaco 
Appendix C 
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Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria 
Norway Peru Poland 
Portugal Republic of Korea Romania 
Russian Federation Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia 
Samoa Senegal Serbia & Montenegro 
Seychelles Singapore Slovakia 
Slovenia Spain Sri Lanka 
Suriname Sweden Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Republic Thailand Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia Ukraine 
United Kingdom United States Uruguay 
Vanuatu Venezuela Viet Nam 
Yemen 
Zambia Hong Kong, China              
(Associate Member) 
Macau, China Faroe Islands  
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FAL Forms 
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 112
 
 
 113
 
 
 114
 
 
 115
 
 
 116
 
 
 117
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Appendix E
Member states to World Customs Organization – as of 30 June 2006 
- 169Members - 
Afghanistan (Transitional 
Islamic State of) 
Albania 
Algeria 
Andorra 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia  
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei Darussalam 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras (Republic of)  
Hong Kong, China 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saint Lucia 
Samoa 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia and Montenegro 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
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Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo (Republic of the) 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Kenya 
Korea (Republic of) 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macau, China 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
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El Salvador (Republic of) 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji Islands 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
Netherlands Antilles 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix F 
Member States of the Kyoto Convention - as of 1 August 2006 
 
 
Algeria  
 
Australia  
 
Austria 
 
Azerbaijan 
 
Belgium 
 
Botswana 
 
Bulgaria 
 
Canada  
 
China Congo (Dem. 
Rep. of the) 
 
Croatia 
 
Cyprus Czech 
Republic 
Denmark  
 
Estonia  
 
European 
Community 
 
Finland 
 
France  
 
Germany  
 
Greece 
 
Hungary India 
 
Ireland 
 
Italy  
 
Japan  
 
Korea 
 
Latvia Lesotho  
 
Lithuania 
 
Luxembourg 
 
Mongolia 
 
Morocco 
 
Namibia 
 
Netherlands  
 
New Zealand  
 
Pakistan Poland  
 
Portugal 
 
Senegal 
 
Slovakia  
 
Slovenia  
 
South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden 
 
Switzerland 
 
Turkey 
 
Uganda United 
Kingdom 
 
United States 
 
Zambia Zimbabwe 
 
   
 
 
Number of Contracting Parties: 50 
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